Competitiveness and Growth of the Mexican Economy. by Daniel Chiquiar & Manuel Ramos Francia
Banco de M¶ exico
Documentos de Investigaci¶ on
Banco de M¶ exico
Working Papers
N± 2009-11
Competitiveness and Growth of the Mexican Economy
Daniel Chiquiar Manuel Ramos-Francia
Banco de M¶ exico Banco de M¶ exico
November, 2009
La serie de Documentos de Investigaci¶ on del Banco de M¶ exico divulga resultados preliminares de
trabajos de investigaci¶ on econ¶ omica realizados en el Banco de M¶ exico con la ¯nalidad de propiciar
el intercambio y debate de ideas. El contenido de los Documentos de Investigaci¶ on, as¶ ³ como las
conclusiones que de ellos se derivan, son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no re°ejan
necesariamente las del Banco de M¶ exico.
The Working Papers series of Banco de M¶ exico disseminates preliminary results of economic
research conducted at Banco de M¶ exico in order to promote the exchange and debate of ideas. The
views and conclusions presented in the Working Papers are exclusively the responsibility of the
authors and do not necessarily re°ect those of Banco de M¶ exico.Documento de Investigaci¶ on Working Paper
2009-11 2009-11
Competitiveness and Growth of the Mexican Economy*
Daniel Chiquiary Manuel Ramos-Franciaz
Banco de M¶ exico Banco de M¶ exico
Abstract: We address the role that deep, structural factors may have as determinants
of Mexico's economic growth. We argue that Mexico's poor growth performance appears
to be associated not only with shorter-run events such as the \lost decade" of the eigh-
ties, but also with supply-side features of the economy that have been present for at least
four decades. Mexico's low competitiveness and poor growth potential seem to re°ect an
institutional framework that tends to support rigid, non-competitive market structures, and
incentives that promote the allocation of resources towards unproductive rent-seeking activi-
ties relatively more than into investment, production, and adoption of superior technologies.
We present examples of input markets where we believe these issues are central. We conclude
that solving this situation requires microeconomic policies that lead to fundamental changes
in the incentive structure of the economy.
Keywords: Competitiveness and growth, productivity, e±ciency, comparative advantage.
JEL Classi¯cation: O31,O43, O12.
Resumen: Se estudia el papel que diversos factores estructurales tienen como deter-
minantes del crecimiento econ¶ omico de M¶ exico. Argumentamos que el desempe~ no de la
econom¶ ³a mexicana ha estado asociado no s¶ olo con eventos de relativamente menor plazo,
como la \d¶ ecada perdida" de los ochenta, sino por factores de oferta que han estado presentes
desde hace por lo menos cuatro d¶ ecadas. El bajo crecimiento y la baja productividad que
M¶ exico ha presentado parecen re°ejar un marco institucional que fomenta estructuras r¶ ³gidas
en los mercados y una falta de competencia en diversos sectores, y genera incentivos para
asignar recursos hacia actividades improductivas en lugar de impulsar la inversi¶ on, la pro-
ducci¶ on y la adquisici¶ on y/o adopci¶ on de mejores tecnolog¶ ³as. Presentamos algunos ejemplos
de mercados de insumos en donde consideramos que estos problemas son fundamentales, y
concluimos que la soluci¶ on de ¶ estos requiere pol¶ ³ticas microecon¶ omicas enfocadas a resolver
los problemas de incentivos que las instituciones actuales han generado.
Palabras Clave: Competencia y crecimiento, productividad, e¯ciencia, ventaja comparati-
va.
*This paper was presented at the Conference \Finance and Economic Growth: Banking and Infrastructure
in Mexico" held at the University of California, San Diego on June 1st, 2007. An earlier article raising some
of the issues discussed in this paper is Ramos-Francia (2006). We thank Carlo Alcaraz, Nicol¶ as Amoroso,
Carlos Capistr¶ an, Javier Cuellas, Rafael Del Villar, Alejandro D¶ ³az de Le¶ on, Edna Fragoso, Alejandro Gayt¶ an,
Eduardo Mart¶ ³nez-Chombo, N¶ uria Quella and H¶ ector Salgado for very helpful comments and contributions.
Jonathan Levistein, Paulina Mart¶ ³nez and Oth¶ on Moreno provided excellent research assistance. The opinions
in this paper correspond to the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Banco de M¶ exico.
y Direcci¶ on General de Investigaci¶ on Econ¶ omica. Email: dchiquiar@banxico.org.mx
z Direcci¶ on General de Investigaci¶ on Econ¶ omica. Email: mrfran@banxico.org.mx  1
1   Introduction 
In this paper we address the role that deep, structural factors may have as 
determinants of Mexico’s growth performance. We argue that the overall performance that 
this country has exhibited at least since the sixties, when compared to other regions that 
have successfully achieved high and sustained growth rates, is fundamentally related to 
supply-side factors that imply a poor long-run growth potential and does not only reflect the 
macroeconomic mismanagement and recurrent crises that led to the “lost decade” of the 
eighties and the Tequila crisis of the mid-nineties. In particular, Mexico’s low 
competitiveness and poor growth potential are apparently related to: i) the presence of rigid 
and non-competitive market structures, which may be leading to an inefficient allocation of 
resources; and, ii) an institutional design which may be promoting rent-seeking activities 
more than investment, production and adoption of superior technologies and efficient work 
practices.  
These features of the Mexican economy may be interrelated. In particular, certain 
weaknesses in the institutional design governing economic activity may be the main 
sources of the existence of rigid and non-competitive market structures which allow 
specific groups of economic agents to extract rents. In turn, these specific groups could be 
influencing the policymaking process and, in particular, the institutional design, to their 
advantage. In the end, these distortions prevent Mexico from fully exploiting its 
comparative advantages. We believe that the solution to this situation, therefore, requires 
microeconomic policies that lead to a deep change in the incentive structure that many 
groups of economic agents face, much more than specific (macroeconomic) policies that 
may act mainly on the demand side of the economy.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts. In the following section we 
illustrate Mexico’s overall growth performance during the last four and a half decades and 
compare it with other more successful developing regions of the world. The third section 
analyzes the issue of competitiveness and presents some empirical evidence related to the 
factors that may be determining Mexico’s recent export and growth performance. The 
fourth section analyzes the markets of some inputs that could be relevant determinants of 
Mexico’s competitiveness and that exemplify the issues raised in this paper. The fifth   2
section describes some recent progress achieved in these areas and highlights some 
challenges that remain. The sixth section summarizes some final thoughts. 
 
2   Mexico’s growth performance 
Figure 1 compares the 1960-2008 behavior of Mexico’s per capita GDP with that of 
other regions that had similar or lower levels of development in 1960, but that had a 
successful growth performance in the following 48 years. In particular, we compare Mexico 
with the group of East Asian countries and with four of the more recently industrialized 
Western European countries. As a benchmark, we also include the performance of the Latin 
American region (excluding Mexico) as a whole.
1 
As may be observed, Mexico’s performance has been unsatisfactory, when 
compared with other developing regions of the world.
2 Indeed, during the last 47 years, 
Mexico’s average per capita growth rate was only 1.8% per year. In contrast, East Asia’s 
growth was 5.1% per year, while the four European countries considered averaged a growth 
rate of 3.2% per year. Consequently, Mexico’s current per capita GDP is around half of the 
levels observed in East Asia and less than half of the European Four countries. These 
current differentials in income stand out if we consider that, in 1960, Mexico’s per capita 
income was only 20% smaller than the one observed in the European Four countries and 
was 2.4 times larger than the average level recorded by the East Asian countries.  
It is important to recognize that, in part, Mexico’s overall poor performance, as 
summarized by average growth rates during the period we are analyzing, reflects the effects 
                                                 
1 The group of East Asian countries includes South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Taiwan. The countries we call European Four are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Latin America 
includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
2 As may be noted, this poor growth performance has characterized the Latin American region as a whole, and 
not only Mexico. Concerning this point, Cole, Ohanian, Riascos and Schmitz, Jr. (2005) conduct a study for 
the whole Latin American region that is similar in spirit to the analysis we make in this section. They reach 
similar conclusions as the ones we present in this paper for the particular case of Mexico. In particular, they 
conclude that Latin America’s stagnation is not the consequence of the post-debt crisis period, but of an 
unsatisfactory performance in terms of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth that has characterized the 
region for a long period of time and, in particular, for decades before the “lost decade” of the eighties. As we 
also do, they suggest that this may reflect inefficient production derived from the presence of barriers to 
competition in the region’s markets. Similarly, Restuccia (2008) finds that the bulk of the difference in GDP 
per capita between Latin America and the U.S. is explained by the low TFP levels in the former, which in turn 
could be a consequence of institutions and policy distortions that increase the costs of doing business (cost of 
entry of plants) and that reallocate resources from the most productive to the less productive plants (public 
enterprises, trade and labor restrictions, taxation, competition barriers and excess regulation, among other 
policies).   3
of macroeconomic mismanagement and the recurrent crises that afflicted the Latin 
American region in general, and Mexico in particular, during the “lost decade” of the 
eighties. Indeed, Mexico’s growth rates were clearly higher during the sixties and seventies 
than during this period (see Table 1). This highlights that one important element to sustain 
economic growth is the application of macroeconomic policies that ensure stability and, in 
particular, that avoid the type of crises observed during the eighties. In this front, Mexico 
has made important progress in the last decade.  
 
Figure 1. Per Capita GDP: Regional Averages (PPP Adjusted) 















































































































































  Macroeconomic stability, however, does not seem to be enough to boost growth 
towards rates comparable to those recorded by the most successful developing regions of 
the world. While periods of macroeconomic stability are indeed associated with higher 
average growth rates, Mexico’s performance was relatively unsatisfactory even in those 
periods. Indeed, as we may observe in Table 1, although a slight recovery was observed in 
Mexico during the nineties, average growth rates were still below those observed prior to 
the eighties and those attained by other developing regions of the world. In fact, growth 
stagnated again in the first eight years of the twenty-first century (from 2001 to 2008), even   4
when the domestic macroeconomic environment was fairly stable.
3 Furthermore, we may 
note that even before macroeconomic stability went astray, during the sixties and seventies 
Mexico’s growth rates were already lower than the ones observed in East Asia and the 
European Four countries.  
 
Table 1. Per Capita GDP: Regional Averages (PPP Adjusted) 
Source: Data from Heston and Summers (2006), updated to 2008 with International Monetary Fund (2009).
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Mexico 3,695 5,109 7,201 6,877 8,082 8,646
European 4 4,629 8,690 11,594 14,459 18,578 21,069
East Asia 1,530 2,589 4,641 8,387 12,947 16,756
Latin America excl. 
Mexico
3,733 4,896 6,648 6,275 7,058 8,310
1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2008 1961-2008
Mexico 3.3 3.5 -0.5 1.6 0.8 1.8
European 4 6.5 2.9 2.2 2.5 1.6 3.2
East Asia 5.4 6.0 6.1 4.4 3.3 5.1
Latin America excl. 
Mexico





  The arguments made above suggest that Mexico’s poor growth rates may be 
reflecting deeper factors that have limited its growth potential from a longer-run 
perspective.
4 The recurrent crises that affected its performance during most of the eighties 
and part of the nineties exacerbated this problem, but do not seem to be the fundamental 
causes of this country’s overall poor long-run performance. This also suggests that, in order 
to boost growth and, thus, converge to the per capita income levels of other successful 
                                                 
3 This is not a consequence of the effects that the global crisis had on Mexico’s growth in 2008. Indeed, the 
average growth rate for 2001-2007 was only 1.1%. 
4 Diverse methods to estimate the growth potential of the Mexican economy, such as HP filters and Blanchard 
and Quah’s (1989) decompositions, among others, suggest that the annual growth of Mexico’s potential GDP 
was within the 3-3.5% interval for 2006-2007. Given these figures and current population trends, Mexico 
would roughly need to double its potential growth rate just in order to achieve South Korea’s current per 
capita GDP level by the year 2020. The results of these exercises are available from the authors upon request. 
The evidence presented in Miketa (2004) and Loayza et al. (2005) suggests that the main factor limiting 
growth of Mexico’s GDP seems to be, in turn, a low rate of growth of TFP.    5
regions, Mexico needs a new set of policies that act mainly on the supply side of the 
economy. In particular, this country is in the need of enhancing its competitiveness.  
 
3   Competitiveness, export performance and growth 
The concept of competitiveness is complex and difficult to define. There is no 
consensus on its definition and significance and, to some, may in fact seem to be a 
meaningless concept (see e.g. Krugman, 1994). To give economic content to this concept, 
we link it to the factors that may lead an open economy to allocate efficiently its available 
resources, so as to achieve the highest possible level of income for its citizens. To the 
extent that the country may initially be below its full productive potential, these factors may 
also influence the rates at which the country catches up to this potential. We therefore 
associate the concept of competitiveness with an open economy’s ability to exploit fully its 
comparative advantages and with the extent to which its system of incentives leads it to 
attain high productivity levels in the sectors where it allocates most of its resources.
5,6 
Indeed, it is difficult to think of a country as being competitive if diverse distortions prevent 
it from exploiting its comparative advantages fully and if its institutional framework 
                                                 
5 According to the World Economic Forum (2007), competitiveness is: “the set of institutions, policies, and 
factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the 
sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy. In other words, more competitive 
economies tend to be able to produce higher levels of income for their citizens. The productivity level also 
determines the rates of return obtained by investments in an economy. Because the rates of return are the 
fundamental determinants of the growth rates of the economy, a more competitive economy is one that is 
likely to grow faster over the medium to long run. The concept of competitiveness thus involves static and 
dynamic components: although the productivity of a country clearly determines its ability to sustain a high 
level of income, it is also one of the central determinants of the returns to investment, which is one of the 
central factors explaining an economy’s growth potential.” 
6 It is important to note that the relevant concept that determines the growth rate of the standard of living of 
the population of a country is the absolute rate of growth of its productivity, and not its productivity growth 
relative to other countries. In particular, real wages of each particular country will adjust to match its own 
labor’s marginal product which, in turn, is driven by the absolute growth rate of its productivity. In this 
context, an acceleration of productivity in other countries will not affect the real wage (and the standard of 
living) of a particular country that does not exhibit such acceleration. In this situation, the exchange rate trend 
would adjust to account for any productivity growth differentials between this country and the rest of the 
world, so that the country with a given productivity growth would be as able to compete in world markets as 
before (see Krugman, 1994). It is the case, however, that the rest of the world would exhibit a faster growth in 
standards of living than the country not achieving an acceleration in its productivity. A caveat to this 
discussion that may be relevant for the issues raised in this paper is that, if productivity in a specific country 
grows slower than in the rest of the world, in those specific sectors where this country concentrates its 
exports, then this productivity differential could indeed lead to a deleterious terms-of-trade effect on this 
country's real income levels (see Johnson, 1955).   6
promotes unproductive rent-seeking activities, rather than investment in physical and 
human capital and the use of superior technologies and efficient work practices.   
It is important to highlight that the concepts mentioned above and, in particular, 
comparative advantage, should not be understood in static terms. Even if, at a specific point 
of time, comparative advantage may be determined by current endowments or technologies, 
the future comparative advantages of a country may in fact reflect choices currently made 
in terms of R&D expenditures, the degree of adoption of new technologies, human capital 
formation, and the degree of specialization in sectors where economies of scale or learning-
by-doing type of spillovers are present (see Krugman, 1986). If a country adopts available 
modern technologies and invests in the formation of a specialized labor force to use these 
technologies in a specific sector, it may develop a comparative advantage there, even if an 
initial comparative advantage was not present.
7  
Under this vision, we believe that the fundamental driver of competitiveness lies in 
the structure of the incentives faced by economic agents. By structure of incentives we 
understand that which is embedded in the set of laws, rules and regulations which 
determines how agents interact economically, politically and socially. It is clear that, even 
if each of the countries that have succeeded in sustaining high growth rates in the last 
decades has taken advantage of specific circumstances, a common factor that seems to be 
present in all of them is an incentive system that rewards physical and human capital 
accumulation, R&D activities, the adoption of modern technologies and, in general, an 
efficient allocation of resources. In particular, some or all of the following interrelated 
factors seem to be essential: i) an institutional design that aligns economic agents’ 
incentives with those activities that provide greater social benefits and, in particular, that 
induces the adoption of superior technologies, investment in physical and human capital 
and the use of efficient work practices; ii) flexibility in the allocation of resources; and, iii) 
markets that operate under contestability conditions.
8 
                                                 
7 Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) argue that the pattern of specialization of a country may have 
implications for economic growth. In particular, some goods may lead to higher knowledge spillovers than 
others. To the extent that one country assigns more resources than another to the production of the first type 
of goods, it may achieve a higher growth rate, even if both countries initially had the same factor endowments 
and technology levels.  
8 It is important to note that these three elements tend to complement each other. For example, the benefits of 
higher competition may be larger and may be reaped faster if there is more flexibility in the allocation of 
resources.   7
Regarding the points listed above consider first the topic of market contestability. It 
is well known that, when an economy operates under competitive conditions, its resources 
are used more efficiently in terms of the value added they generate. Furthermore, under a 
competitive environment, consumers have greater access to a wider variety of goods and 
services, at lower prices. In contrast, non-competitive market structures imply welfare 
losses derived from allocative and productive inefficiencies and, in fact, may entail 
additional, larger losses if they induce unproductive rent-seeking activities.
9  
Related to the above, a recent strand of the literature has formalized the existence of 
a link between the presence of barriers to competition and the use of inferior technologies 
and inefficient work practices (see Holmes and Schmitz, 1995 and 2001; Krusell and Rios-
Rull, 1996; Parente and Prescott, 1999 and 2000). According to this literature, barriers to 
the adoption of more productive technologies are erected in some countries in order to 
protect industry insiders with vested interests from outside competition. These insiders 
would lose rents if superior technologies developed elsewhere are adopted in their country, 
and are able to successfully block their adoption as a consequence of: i) their larger ability 
to organize themselves and overcome free rider problems in their efforts to lobby for 
policies that are beneficial to them, usually by being politically over-represented; and, ii) 
the fact that, while the benefits of protection are concentrated by small, identifiable groups 
of incumbents, the costs of protective policies are usually spread among large groups of 
agents (see Bridgman, Livshits and MacGee, 2007).
10  Thus, even when the social costs of 
protection may be larger than the private benefits received by incumbents, their asymmetric 
ability to lobby effectively may lead to an equilibrium in which governments decide to 
protect them through the prohibition of the adoption of technologies that would make all 
                                                 
9 See Motta (2004). The aforementioned considerations may become especially relevant when non-
competitive structures and pricing characterize markets for general-use inputs and, especially, in sectors 
where inputs are supplied through networks (telecommunications, energy, transport, etc.). In this case, not 
only consumers may be affected directly, but the overall industrial sector’s competitiveness may be hurt by 
higher basic input prices, which in turn may affect the economy’s growth potential.    
10 Coalitions of workers in a specific industry that have a lot to gain from a specific protective policy may 
easily have the ability to punish individuals who don’t contribute to the efforts to lobby for protection by 
excluding them from working in the industry. In contrast, broad based lobby groups of consumers who are 
affected by higher prices may not be able to avoid specific individuals who do not cooperate from purchasing 
goods. This idea goes back to Olson (1982), who argued that policies that protect small groups at the expense 
of the general public exist because small groups may organize themselves more effectively.    8
workers of the economy more productive.
11,12 This mechanism appears to be able to explain 
a considerable part of the differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) observed across 
different countries of the world (see e.g. Parente and Prescott, 1999 and 2000; Herrendorf 
and Teixeira, 2004).
13 
In order to be able to exploit comparative advantages fully, flexibility in the 
allocation of resources is also required, especially when prices may be changing as a 
consequence of diverse shocks in the international goods’ markets. In this context, rigid 
market structures may slow down or prevent the movement of factors of production 
towards their most productive uses.
14 For example, diverse policy-induced labor market 
distortions and rigidities, such as employment subsidies or dismissal costs, may lead to an 
equilibrium in which labor is inefficiently allocated into low-productivity firms, thus 
lowering aggregate TFP (see Caballero et al., 2006; Lagos, 2006). Bankruptcy laws that 
lead to an equilibrium with inefficiently many low-productivity firms actively operating 
may act in the same direction (Bergoeing et al., 2002). Again, in some cases these rigidities 
                                                 
11 More intense competition may also boost innovation by inducing incumbents that are close to the 
technological frontier to “escape competition” by innovating (Aghion and Griffith, 2005) or by increasing the 
relative profitability that entrepreneurs face of selling innovations to incumbents instead of entering the 
market (Norbäck and Persson, 2008). In both cases, an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition 
and innovation is predicted.   
12 Even if the particular interest group that is benefited by the status quo is not politically over-represented 
and does not influence policymaking directly, comprehensive reform to the institutional framework may be 
difficult to achieve. This is the case when different unequally endowed constituencies exist. Each of these 
constituencies would support some reforms that expand its own opportunities but will oppose others that 
reduce them, even when the latter could benefit other constituencies. These groups could therefore find it hard 
to agree on reforms. In this context, a comprehensive reform path that would lead to overall gains for the 
society may not be supported by majority vote in a democratic system (see Rajan, 2009).   
13 The evidence in Clark (1987) and Wolcott (1994) suggests that differences in work practices, themselves 
determined by differences in workers’ ability to resist employers’ attempts to increase the number of 
machines per worker in the textile industry, were a key determinant of cross-country productivity differences 
in this industry at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the other hand, using the Great Lakes iron ore 
producers’ experience in the early 1980s as an empirical example, Schmitz (2005) shows that increased 
competition promotes productivity improvements. He shows that, in this particular experience, productivity 
increases observed after producers started facing foreign competition were mostly the result of changes in 
work practices, and not fundamentally related to more conventional factors, such as the closure of low-
productivity mines, changes in the scale of production of individual mines, improvements of technology or 
changes in the skill composition of the labor force.  
14 As we will see below, one such shock could be China’s increasing presence as a supplier of labor-intensive 
manufactured goods and a demander of commodities in international markets. This has contributed to a 
change in relative prices that has affected the terms of trade of labor-abundant manufacturing exporters and 
has benefited commodity exporters. Clearly, a manufacturing exporting country will be in a better position to 
face this shock without large welfare losses to the extent that it has enough flexibility to move its resources 
out of labor-intensive manufacturing towards other sectors of the economy where it may retain comparative 
advantages, such as could be some commodities, skill-intensive manufactures or services.    9
may be responding to vested interests of groups that could be harmed by more flexible 
market structures and that have the ability to influence the regulatory process.   
The discussion in the previous paragraphs suggests that diverse features defining the 
structure of incentives of the economy may lower aggregate TFP by either: i) inhibiting the 
adoption of superior technologies; or, ii) leading to an inefficient allocation of available 
resources, for given technology levels.
15 Along with the degree of monopoly power and the 
presence of rigidities in product or input markets, other institutional features of the 
economy, such as those related with contract enforcement, private governance, the design 
of public policies and intellectual property rights, among others, may also affect aggregate 
TFP through these two mechanisms (see e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2006; Khan and 
Sokoloff, 2007; Acemoglu et al.; 2007; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2007). Not surprisingly, it 
would seem to be the case that the most profound factor determining long-term economic 
performance is related with the broad set of institutions governing economic, political and 
social interactions between different groups or agents (see Hall and Jones, 1999). This 
institutional framework not only determines to what extent non-competitive and rigid 
market structures may be perpetuated or not through the influence of interest groups on the 
regulatory process, but in general defines the incentive structure that economic agents face 
in order to produce, invest in physical and human capital and conduct activities that lead to 
the use of superior technologies and efficient work practices.
16  
Of course, this discussion begs the question of how these institutions are designed 
and built in the first place. In particular, in many developing countries which currently find 
themselves in the phase of building up institutions, it is relevant to analyze what incentives 
                                                 
15 Some distortions could affect productivity through both mechanisms simultaneously. See a related 
discussion in Lagos (2006).  
16 A growing strand of the literature suggests the existence of a link between comparative advantage and 
international differences in institutional factors, such as property rights protection, contract enforcement and 
labor market flexibility. In particular, it is shown that, holding other factors constant, countries with better 
institutions tend to specialize in industries that are more sensitive to the presence of efficient institutions (see 
Levchenko, 2004; Nunn, 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2007; Costinot, 2007; Cuñat and Melitz, 2007). In this 
context, superior institutions may lead some countries to specialize in sectors with larger spillover effects, as 
in Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007), and to enjoy higher economic growth rates (see Young, 1991; 
Levchenko, 2004). Furthermore, institutional quality induced international specialization may also influence 
returns to schooling and, thus, human capital accumulation. In particular, individuals may endogenously 
choose their schooling levels, knowing that institutional development determines the benefits from education 
(see Vogel, 2006). In this context, institutional quality may be a common cause of both comparative 
advantage and of human capital accumulation. Indeed, the higher levels of human capital observed in 
developed countries may reflect, therefore, an endogenous response to the presence of superior institutions.    10
face those that are designing them. In effect, in many cases it is not difficult to see that 
institutions may begin to become flawed at the very stage of conception (in terms of not 
being designed to promote long-term growth).  
  
3.1   Mexico’s lack of competitiveness 
Within the conceptual framework described above, Mexico’s low competitiveness 
appears to be related to an institutional design that seems to support the presence of rigid 
and non-competitive market structures, which in turn may lead to an inefficient allocation 
of resources and to a low degree of adoption of superior technologies and efficient work 
practices. In particular, the institutional framework tends to be relatively more conducive to 
the promotion of unproductive rent-seeking activities than to the enhancement of the 
productive potential of the economy (see Levy and Walton, 2009). Indeed, there are many 
examples where the conditions to achieve an efficient allocation of resources and to boost 
productivity are not met: 
 
a)  First, in relation to institutional design, it is well known that Mexico’s position in 
diverse international indexes that compare the countries’ institutional framework is 
relatively low and has been deteriorating in the last few years. For example, in the 
World Economic Forum sub index of institutions (which belongs to the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) of this Forum), Mexico’s position is very low when 
compared to several other countries, many of which, as will be shown below, are 
Mexico’s direct competitors in international markets (see Figure 2).
17,18 
Furthermore, the country’s position has been deteriorating in the last years. Indeed, 
from being in position 50 in 2003, Mexico fell to position 98 in 2009.
19,20 In terms 
of the GCI, Mexico moved from position 47 in 2003 to position 60 in 2009.
21 
                                                 
17 Prior to the 2005-2006 report, this sub index referred exclusively to public institutions. In the last five 
reports, however, this sub index also includes an evaluation of private institutions. 
18 We define the basket of Mexico’s competitors as the group of countries that exhibit a high and statistically 
significant Spearman correlation with Mexico in terms of their patterns of comparative advantage. This group 
includes China, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Turkey, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Hungary, Poland and Portugal. We describe below the methodology used to identify this group of 
countries.  
19 The sample of countries surveyed for these indexes has been increasing along time. Considering the same 
group of countries that have been present in all surveys within the 2003-2009 period, Mexico went from 
position 49 in 2003 to position 74 in 2009.   11
Figure 2. Competitiveness Index; Quality of Institutions  
(Value and position 2009-2010) 


















































There are some specific dimensions related with its institutional design in which 
Mexico tends to be rated unfavorably. Among others, we may mention 
accountability, political stability, rule of law and corruption (see Kauffman, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999). Possibly as a consequence of this, the system of 
incentives to conduct activities that lead to the use of superior technologies seems to 
be ineffective: according to the evidence presented in Lederman, Maloney and 
Servén (2005), Mexico underperforms other countries in terms of diverse indicators 
of R&D investment, innovation efforts and technology adoption, even after 
controlling for its level of development. To this list we should add that, as we will 
discuss below, in some specific markets of nontradable goods the prevalent 
                                                                                                                                                     
20 Other indexes tell fundamentally the same story. For example, Mexico’s position within the confidence 
index among foreign direct investment recipient countries (FDI Confidence Index) computed by A.T. 
Kearney (2005) remained in the first ten places from 1998 to 2004 and, in that last year, Mexico was rated 
third. From 2005 on, however, Mexico fell dramatically, placing itself in the 16
th position in 2006 and in the 
19
th position in 2007.  It is also worthwhile to mention the results of Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005), who 
rank OECD countries according to diverse product market regulation indicators. The results suggest that 
Mexico and Hungary are the only countries within the most-regulated group that did not exhibit significant 
improvements between 1998 and 2003. Furthermore, in some specific dimensions, such as in barriers to 
competition and to trade and investment, Mexico's 2003 rating worsened, as compared to 1998.  
21 If we keep the sample of countries constant, Mexico fell from position 47 in 2003 to position 49 in 2009 in 
the GCI.    12
incentives seem to make it more profitable to engage in rent-seeking activities than 
to pursue the creation of wealth.  
 
b)  While the process of trade liberalization started in the late 80´s may have brought 
with it more market discipline into manufacturing, competition did not seem to have 
reached many non-tradable sectors. In this context, the non-competitive market 
structure of many inputs that are provided through networks, such as financial 
services, telecommunications, electricity and transport, may be affecting the 
competitiveness of firms that use intensively these inputs (see Perez Motta, 2007).
22 
We will analyze these issues with more detail in the following sections. 
 
c)  Similarly, a good example of market rigidities in Mexico is provided by the labor 
market. Several regulatory constraints currently in place, such as the difficulties to 
create flexible labor contracts and the high dismissal costs, may limit the flexibility 
with which resources in this market are allocated towards their most productive uses 
and may be reducing the incentives to invest in human capital, therefore affecting 
aggregate productivity and potential growth.
23 Indeed, according to the results of 
diverse studies (Heckman and Pagés, 2004; Botero, et al.,2004)., Mexico’s labor 
regulations tend to imply large rigidities and compare unfavorably with many other 
countries of the world in terms of labor market flexibility (see Figure 3). It is 
important to highlight that the formal sector of the economy tends to comply with 
these regulations to a larger extent than the informal sector. In this context, although 
the existence of a large informal sector may enhance the true flexibility of the 
market, this is apparently being achieved at the cost of having a relatively large 
                                                 
22 Hanson (1994) warned that, without appropriate antitrust policies in place at the time, the liberalization 
reforms undertaken in Latin America during the eighties and, in particular, the privatization of highly 
concentrated industries, could lead to a situation in which the governments would only trade the inefficiencies 
of state control with the inefficiencies of imperfect competition.  
23 In fact, more can be said. According to the model in Lagos (2006), certain features of the economy, such as 
high costs of creating new jobs, large dismissal costs and an absence of unemployment insurance, would all 
act in the direction of lowering equilibrium unemployment and aggregate TFP, by leading to a smaller rate of 
destruction of low-productivity firm-worker matches. In this context, it is relevant to note that open 
unemployment rates in Mexico are well known to be indeed low, by international standards. As will be seen 
below, consistently with Lagos (2006), the consequence of the rigidities in the Mexican labor market seems to 
be instead a large prevalence of low-productivity jobs in the informal sector of the economy.         13
share of the labor force employed in relatively low productivity jobs.
24 In fact, it 
may be possible to argue that the presence of a large informal sector is precisely a 
market response to the presence of diverse distortions, such as onerous regulations 
in the formal sector of the economy, non-competitive market structures (which limit 
the levels of employment in the formal sector), and social protection policies that 
could be increasing the relative benefits to workers of becoming employed in the 
informal sector of the economy (see Levy, 2007).  
 
Figure 3. Labor Market rigidity 
 
Separation Rigidity Index /2 Labor Contract Rigidity Index /1
/1 Corresponds to the value of the Alternative employment contracts Subindex.
/2 Corresponds to the average of the Job Security Subindex and the Protection to Dismissal Subindex.














































































































































































































































































































































It is important to note that the rigidities in terms of labor contract creation and job 
separation are not the only distortions that may be characterizing the labor market. 
Other factors, such as the bargaining strength of labor unions in some strategic 
(non-tradable) sectors that provide basic inputs and where product market 
competition is lacking, may be equally or even more relevant. Indeed, the 
bargaining power of trade unions in sectors with limited competition tends to 
                                                 
24 According to preliminary results in Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Ramos Francia (2008), the formal-informal 
income gap, controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity of workers, is estimated to be larger than 
10%. This could be suggestive of a significant productivity gap between these sectors. Furthermore, according 
to Levy (2007), given the productivity differentials between the informal and formal sectors, the cost of 
having an inefficiently high level of informal employment in Mexico may represent around 1.3% of yearly 
GDP.    14
generate a pattern of rent sharing that translates into high prices, low service quality, 
and restrictions on the creation of productive employment and investment in human 
capital and modern technologies. In Section 3 of this paper we will see the specific 
case of the electricity industry. These distortions may be acting as a tax on 
employment and production in the formal sector of the economy and may be clearly 
limiting the competitiveness of industries that use these inputs intensively.  
 
It is relevant to note that there is feedback between institutions supporting an 
efficient allocation of resources, the degree of competition and market flexibility. For 
example, a lack of competition in a sector may lead to the presence of a weak regulatory 
institution, by enhancing the insiders’ ability to influence the policymaking process. Such 
institutional weakness, in turn, tends to reinforce the permanence of a lack of competition 
in that sector.  
 
Figure 4. Competitiveness in Mexico 
 
 Inefficient institutional 
design
 Lack of competition
 Market rigidities
 Weak regulation and supervision
 Lack of innovation and investment
 Inefficient allocation of resources and 
rent seeking
• Insufficient growth
• Low employment 
opportunities
• High income inequality
Low competitiveness
 Suboptimal human 
and physical  
infrastructure levels
 High input prices 
 Weak public finances
 
 
These ideas are illustrated in Figure 4. An inappropriate institutional design, a lack 
of competition, and market rigidities lead to an environment of weak regulation and 
supervision, induce rent seeking behavior and an inefficient allocation of resources and 
have as a consequence low innovation and adoption of modern technologies, as well as   15
reduced investment rates. These factors, along with their consequences on the levels of 
human and physical capital, on public finances and on the setting of (non-competitive) 
prices, diminish the competitiveness of the economy. More importantly, in such an 
environment, these results in turn may reinforce an environment of low competition and 
market rigidities, through the influence that specific rent-seeking groups may have on the 
institutional design process. This vicious cycle not only leads to low competitiveness, but 
ultimately translates into less employment opportunities, slower growth and an inequitable 
distribution of income. Indeed, within this framework an inefficient allocation of resources, 
a low growth potential and a high income inequality may be seen as consequences of an 
institutional design that protects specific interest groups by maintaining an economic 
environment characterized by inequality in opportunities and, thus, by preventing some 
agents in the economy from fully exploiting their economic potential (see Bourguignon and 
Dessus, 2009).  
 
3.2   Comparative advantage and export performance of the Mexican economy 
Mexico’s relatively low competitiveness seems to have become more evident as 
other countries that have comparative advantages in goods in which Mexico had previously 
specialized in have increasingly gained market access in international trade flows. Indeed, 
the increased competition from these countries has had significant effects on Mexico’s 
international trade. As we may observe in Figure 5, after NAFTA came into effect and up 
to the year 2001, Mexico had been gaining share in the U.S. manufactured goods market. 
After the end of that year, which coincides with China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Mexico lost share in this market continuously until 2005.
25 
Simultaneously, China quickly gained market share.
26  
                                                 
25 After 2005, the share of Mexican manufacturing exports within U.S. imports exhibited an erratic behavior. 
In particular, it rose during 2006 and 2007, only to decrease again in 2008. Finally, during the first eight 
months of 2009 it rose again. This pattern seems to have responded to diverse shocks, such as the changes in 
the U.S. economy’s position in the business cycle, the differences between the growth of U.S. GDP and its 
industrial production (which is more closely linked to Mexico’s manufacturing) and the depreciation of 
Mexico’s real exchange rate in the last quarter of 2008. By the first eight months of 2009, however, Mexico’s 
share in U.S. imports was still below the one observed before China’s entry into the WTO.     
26 If we consider the basket of Mexico’s competitors as a whole, it has also been gaining share in the U.S. 
market since 2002. However, if we take China out from the basket, the rest of competitors have been losing 
market share. In part, this may be driven by the fact that some goods produced within the Asian block may 
have started to be shipped from China after 2001, whereas in previous years they were shipped from other 
countries within the block. Thus, part of the apparent market share loss of the rest of Mexico’s competitors   16
In order to evaluate the relevance of the aforementioned events in greater detail, 
several empirical projects have been conducted within the economic research division of 
Banco de México in the last few years. A brief summary of the most important findings 
obtained from these studies is described in the following pages.  
 
































































    China
    Basket of Competitors without China /1 
1/ Mexico’s basket of competitors includes Taiwan, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Turkey, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Hungary, Poland and Portugal.
*2009 data are from January to August.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
3.2.1   Mexico's pattern of comparative advantages 
We first used the United Nations COMTRADE bilateral trade database to compute 
revealed comparative advantage indexes for Mexico and for all other countries in the 
database whose total manufacturing exports amounted to at least 15% of Mexico’s total 
manufacturing exports during the period of analysis.
27 These indexes were computed for 
263 comprehensive manufacturing categories (three-digit SITC classification) and for the 
                                                                                                                                                     
after 2001 may in fact simply be reflecting a substitution of the shipments’ origin. It is relevant to note, 
however, that to the extent to which the Asian “block” has become more competitive as a whole through a 
more intensive use of China’s labor force, this means that Mexico’s comparative advantages may not only be 
threatened directly by China, but more generally by the increased competitiveness of an Asian production 
“block”. 
27 Further details concerning this study, the methodology undertaken and the results obtained are found in 
Chiquiar, Fragoso and Ramos-Francia (2007) and in Amoroso, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009).   17
period going from 1996 to 2005.
28,29 Mexico’s revealed comparative advantage index for 










































i RCA  Revealed comparative advantage index for Mexico in product i. 

Mexico
i X  Value of Mexico’s exports of good i.  

World
i X  Worldwide value of exports of good i. 
 
The interpretation of this index is straightforward: a country is said to be revealing 
to have a comparative advantage in good i whenever the share of good i in its exports is 
larger than the share of this good in worldwide exports; that is, whenever the index of this 
country for good i is greater than one. We estimated these indexes for each year from 1996 
to 2005, as well as for the whole 1996-2005 period. The results that follow were not 
affected by the choice of using the indexes for each particular year or for the full sample 
period.   
We first used these indexes to identify Mexico’s main competitors, in terms of the 
degree of their similarity with Mexico’s pattern of comparative advantages. In order to do 
                                                 
28 The commodity groupings of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) are based on the 
materials used in production, the processing stage, market practices and uses of the goods, the importance of 
the commodities in terms of world trade, and technological change.   
29 As discussed in footnote 25, after 2005 diverse higher-frequency shocks, not necessarily associated with the 
issues that concern us here, started affecting Mexico’s exports behavior. On the other hand, data before 1996 
are affected by the Tequila crisis. We therefore chose a sample going from 1996 to 2005.  
30 Note that, since revealed comparative advantage indexes are computed using data on observed international 
trade flows and not on factor endowments or technology, they may be affected by distortions to international 
trade. For example, a country that subsidizes its exports of a good could seem to have a comparative 
advantage in such good, even if it doesn’t have it given its factor endowments or technology. Similarly, a 
country that, for diverse distortions in the input markets, is not exporting a good for which it has a 
comparative advantage, would seem not to have it according to these indexes. 
(1)  18
so, we computed the Spearman correlation coefficients of Mexico’s 1996-2005 revealed 
comparative advantage with respect to the rest of the countries. We computed these 
correlations using two different benchmarks: i) the full worldwide trade volumes; and ii) 
U.S. imports from each country.
31  
 
Figure 6. Mexico's main trade competitors 
 
Mexico’s Competitors in Worldwide 
Manufacturing Markets
(Spearman Correlation Between Mexico and other 
Countries’ RCA Indices)
Mexico’s Competitors in the US 
Manufacturing Market
(Spearman Correlation Between Mexico and other 
Countries’ RCA Indices)
Comparative advantage was computed using 1996-2005 exports of manufactures, disaggregated into 263 different categories. 















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6 summarizes the results. The left hand side illustrates the countries that 
exhibit a significantly positive correlation with Mexico’s RCA in worldwide trade flows, 
while the right hand side illustrates the ordering of countries with a significant correlation 
with Mexico when the analysis is restricted to the U.S. market. Note that the first twelve 
countries in each listing are the same. On the other hand, Singapore is the thirteenth most 
important competitor if we restrict the analysis to exports directed to the U.S., even when it 
appears to be a less important competitor if we take worldwide export flows as a 
                                                 
31 According to COMTRADE figures, on average 82% of Mexican manufacturing exports were directed to 
the U.S. in the 1996-2005 period. 
Comparative advantage was computed using 1996-2005 exports of manufactures, disaggregated into 263 categories.  
Source: Amoroso, Chiquiar and Ramos –Francia (2009). Elaborated using United Nations’ COMTRADE data.   19
benchmark.
32 Given these results, we defined the basket of Mexico’s main competitors as 
Hungary, Thailand, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Poland, China, Portugal, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia and Singapore.
33 China stands out within this group, given 
the large size of its labor force and, therefore, the degree to which it may displace Mexico’s 
exports in international markets. This is why, in most of the international comparisons we 
make in this paper, we distinguish China from the rest of Mexico’s competitors.  
We also used the estimates described above to analyze how Mexico’s revealed 
comparative advantages compare with China’s and the basket of Mexico’s competitors for 
specific product categories. Within the most relevant categories, we identified three 
different groups that amount to around 90% of Mexican manufacturing exports and that 
differ in terms of the evolution of Mexico’s competitive position vis-à-vis its competitors. 
A first group, representing around 40% of Mexican total manufacturing exports, 
corresponds to goods in which Mexico seems to have been recently losing its comparative 
advantage, when compared to China and/or the basket of competitors. This group includes 
machinery and electrical equipment (15% of Mexican manufacturing exports in 2005); 
telecommunications equipment (14.2%); office machinery and automatic data processing 
(6.1%); furniture and parts (3%); and non metallic mineral manufactures (1.3%). Figure 7 
illustrates the evolution of Mexico’s, China’s and the full basket of competitors’ revealed 
comparative advantage indexes for the first three categories of this group. It is possible to 
note that the basket of competitors has recently overtaken Mexico in the machinery and 
electrical equipment sector. Meanwhile, by the end of the sample period, China had 
apparently caught up with Mexico’s comparative advantage in telecommunications 
equipment production. Finally, the case of computers shows dramatically how China 
recently displaced Mexico in terms of its comparative advantage in a short period of time. 
 
                                                 
32 However, for most years in the sample, the correlation between Mexico and Singapore’s RCA indexes 
computed with U.S. imports were as high as the ones obtained for other relevant competitors. This is why we 
chose to keep Singapore in the basket of competitors for the subsequent analysis. The results were 
qualitatively unchanged if instead we chose to drop Singapore from the analysis.  
33 Apart from the specific consideration mentioned in the previous footnote related to the inclusion of 
Singapore, this list includes those countries that exhibit a Spearman correlation above 0.20 in the left hand 
side of Figure 6. Note that several other countries also exhibit a statistically significant, but lower correlation 
with Mexico (the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Japan, Sweden, India, etc.). These countries were not included 
in the basket. However, the results of the analysis we make in the following pages were found not to be 
affected significantly if instead we kept these countries in the basket.   20
Figure 7. Revealed comparative advantages 
Telecommunications 
Equipment*
*14.16% of Mexico’s manufactured 
exports in 2005.
Office Machinery and Data 
Processing*
*6.13% of Mexico’s manufactured 
exports in 2005.
Source: Amoroso, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009). Elaborated using United Nations COMTRADE data.
Machinery and Electrical 
Equipment*



























































































A second group of products (around 12% of Mexico’s manufacturing exports) 
corresponds to goods in which Mexico does not apparently have a comparative advantage 
with respect to China and/or its basket of competitors. In these cases, Mexico’s export 
performance during the first years of NAFTA may have been influenced by preferential 
access to the United States. Thus, the increasing market access of other competitors in the 
last years could therefore lead to a rapid displacement of Mexico’s exports of these goods. 
Within this second group are included apparel and clothing accessories (4.1%); diverse 
manufactured articles, such as toys and sporting goods (2.8%); metal manufacturing 
(2.8%); threads, weaves and articles made from textile fibers (1.3%); construction 
accessories (0.9%); and photographic equipment (0.4%). Figure 8 illustrates the case of 
clothing, where Mexico does not appear to have a comparative advantage over China and 
its full basket of competitors. In this case, the growing market access of China is known to 
have led to a significant reduction of employment in Mexico’s apparel industry after the 
year 2001 (see Lederman et al., 2006; Gruben, 2006). 
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*4.05% of Mexico’s manufactured exports in 2005.





Finally, a third group of products, representing around a third of Mexico’s 
manufacturing exports, corresponds to goods in which Mexico apparently maintains a solid 
comparative advantage and, in particular, seems to be so far free of relevant competition 
from most countries within the basket of competitors we have defined. This group includes 
the automobile industry (19.3%); machinery and power generators (4.8%); general 
machinery and industrial equipment (4.6%); professional, scientific and control instruments 
(4.6%); and beverages (1.6%). Figure 9 illustrates the case of the automobile industry. 
Mexico’s comparative advantage in this sector seems to be apparently related to the low 
transport costs to the U.S. market and the lower labor costs with respect to that country (see 
Moavenzadeh, J. (2008); A.T. Kearney, 2008; Sturgeon et al., 2009). Another factor that 
may be behind this apparent comparative advantage may be the fact that firms in this sector 
may face particularly large costs of relocating the plants they currently have in Mexico, in 
terms of both the high fixed costs of building new plants and the need to generate new 
business networks in other locations that this relocation would entail. 
Two aspects, however, should be emphasized concerning the automobile industry. 
First, perhaps China and the basket of competitors defined here are not the relevant 
competitors with which we should be making comparisons. Second, the Mexican 
automobile industry could indeed become vulnerable if China or India enters the 
automobile export market. Given the stronger competition that this could bring, Mexico   22
could try to complement its apparent advantages in terms of labor and transport costs with 
specific policies that reduce the costs of some other important inputs of this industry 
(electricity, transportation infrastructure, etc.) and that enhance the attractiveness of Mexico 
as an investment site for automobile assembly plants (see A.T. Kearney, 2007).   
 
Figure 9. Revealed comparative advantages 
*19.32% of Mexico’s manufactured exports in 2005.
















Given the findings described above, it is possible to conclude that around half of 
Mexican manufacturing exports correspond to product categories in which Mexico could 
potentially face (or is already facing) a significant displacement in international markets. 
While part of these categories correspond to products in which Mexico does not have a 
comparative advantage and, thus, this displacement may be efficient from a welfare point 
of view, in other categories, Mexico’s recent loss of comparative advantage could be 
reflecting its gradual loss of competitiveness as a consequence of diverse distortions, 
particularly in the factor markets. We will discuss this hypothesis more thoroughly in the 
following sections of the paper.  
The events described above may be reflecting the fact that, just as Mexico does, 
some of the countries that have gained market access in the last few years tend to have a 
relative abundance in unskilled labor. Thus, it is not surprising that these countries have 
tended to enter the same markets that Mexico went into after its trade liberalization and,   23
especially, after NAFTA started operating. The large size of the Chinese workforce has 
made this problem, however, very pressing. In particular, this country seems to have 
comparative advantages in precisely the types of goods in which Mexico had previously 
specialized in, given its own pattern of comparative advantages.  
The argument made above can be illustrated with the scatter plots depicted in Figure 
10, where we show the correlation of Mexico’s 1996-2001 and 2002-2005 average revealed 
comparative advantage indexes with the change in its market share within U.S. imports for 
these two periods.
34 We observe that, from 1996 to 2001, Mexico tended to increase its 
market share to a larger extent in product categories in which it exhibited a relatively high 
revealed comparative advantage index. The Spearman correlation coefficient for this 
relationship is statistically significant at a 1% level. In contrast with the previous period, 
from 2002 to 2005 Mexico’s market share loss was significantly larger in product 
categories where Mexico had specialized in, suggesting that it is in these precise markets 
where Mexican producers faced fiercer competition after 2001.  
 















































































Source: Chiquiar, Fragoso and Ramos-Francia (2007). Elaborated using United Nations COMTRADE data.




                                                 
34 These scatter plots were constructed using the computations at a two-digit SITC level (61 manufacturing 
categories). The results were not different from an analysis made at a three-digit SITC classification level.    24
These results do not mean that the concept of revealed comparative advantage is 
irrelevant to determine export performance. Figure 11 again presents scatter plots 
correlating Mexico’s export performance with its average revealed comparative advantages. 
This time, however, we compare Mexico’s revealed comparative advantages, measured 
relative to China’s, with Mexico’s market share changes, also relative to China’s market 
share changes. We may observe that, both before and after China entered the WTO, 
Mexico had a relatively better market performance in product categories in which its 
revealed comparative advantage is relatively larger, when compared to China. 
 
Figure 11. Relative RCA and Difference of 
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Source: Chiquiar, Fragoso and Ramos-Francia (2007). Elaborated using United Nations COMTRADE data.




A relevant question concerning these results is: do these apparent consequences of 
competition from other countries matter for welfare and growth? Mexico’s loss of 
comparative advantage in some manufacturing activities and, in particular, the terms of 
trade effects of this shock, would have less adverse effects if markets within Mexico were 
undistorted and flexible enough to face the shock implied by the entry of new competitors 
in worldwide markets through an efficient reallocation of resources. Indeed, in that case, we 
should have expected a reallocation of resources out of the manufacturing activities where 
Mexico lost comparative advantage into other activities in which a comparative advantage 
remained.    25
In relation to this point, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2008) show evidence that, to 
some extent, the Mexican manufacturing sector indeed reacted to the increase in 
competition on the U.S. import market by shifting resources towards sectors where it 
remained competitive. This is illustrated in Figure 12. We plot the change in the share 
within overall Mexico’s manufacturing exports to the U.S. of each of 61 comprehensive 
manufacturing categories (2-digit level SITC classification) for the period 2001-2006, 
against the corresponding initial (2001) revealed comparative advantage index within the 
U.S. market. The figure includes the corresponding linear and Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients. One or two asterisks are added when such correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant at a 10 or 5% level, respectively.  
 
Figure 12. Mexico’s Revealed Comparative Advantages  
and Export Specialization in the U.S. Market 
Note: Based on 2-digit SITC (61 groups)



























































































Linear 0.0239 0.412 **
Rank (Spearman) 0.3131 ** 0.409 **
Full Sample W/o Outliers
 
 
As can be seen, there is a significantly positive correlation between the initial 
comparative advantage of Mexico in the U.S. market and the growth of exports towards 
that market in the following 6 years. This correlation seems to be especially strong both if 
we use the usual linear correlation coefficient and we drop two outliers (apparel and office 
machinery), which are two sectors that were particularly affected by Chinese competition, 
or if we use the Speraman’s rank correlation coefficient. What these results suggest is that 
in the years following China’s entry to the WTO, Mexico did adjust its export structure in   26
favor of product categories in which it exhibited a larger comparative advantage index at 
the time of the shock.  
The reallocation of resources described above, however, seems to have been 
insufficient to avoid Mexico from facing important costs from the entry of other 
competitors into the manufacturing markets. First, the increased competition from China 
has not only implied a market share loss of Mexican exports, but also a loss of capital 
stock, as some plants in footloose industries, such as apparel, stopped operating after 
China’s entry to WTO.
35 Furthermore, as mentioned before, the evidence in Levy (2007) 
and Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2008) suggests that informal services in 
Mexico, where a part of the labor force has been reallocated into, have lower productivity 
levels than manufacturing. In this context, the movement of labor from relatively higher-
productivity manufacturing to relatively lower-productivity informal services may not only 
be affecting the overall productivity level of the economy. In fact, as will be seen below, 
the empirical evidence suggests that Mexico is precisely losing market share against other 
competitors, such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, in exports that may have 
relatively larger spillover effects. This means that, if labor is moving towards sectors that 
do not exhibit such externalities, the reallocation of labor in the Mexican economy may be 
implying a reduction of long-run growth (see Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007). 
Finally, as we will show in the following section, Mexico’s competitiveness and export 
performance may not only be reflecting true differences between Mexico and other 
countries in terms of factor endowments or technology, but may also be partly a result of 
distortions in the markets for inputs that are relevant for production, such as financial 
services, telecommunications and energy. In this case, the patterns of comparative 
advantage (and, thus, export performance) could be distorted by the presence of input 
market imperfections. In this context, there could be scope for public policies directed 




                                                 
35 According to data from INEGI, between July 2001 and December 2006 the number of maquiladora plants 
diminished from 3735 to 2783. 70% of this reduction corresponds to the closure of plants in the apparel 
sector.   27
3.2.2   Determinants of Mexico's comparative advantages and export performance 
Given the results above, we attempted to identify the determinants of Mexico’s 
revealed comparative advantages and of its export performance to the U.S. In particular, we 
tried to determine if the pattern of Mexico’s revealed comparative advantages and its export 
performance are related to Ricardian-type productivity differentials with respect to its main 
competitors, or to differences in factor requirements across sectors, which in turn would 
suggest a factor-endowment explanation of this country’s trade patterns.
36 
To conduct this study, we complemented the estimates of revealed comparative 
advantage obtained in the study described before with estimates of TFP levels for each of 
39 comprehensive manufacturing industries and for each of the countries analyzed in this 
research agenda.
37 The period was chosen to match as closely as possible the years for 
which we computed revealed comparative advantage indexes. Limitations from the sources 
used, however, implied that we had to compute these productivity measures only for the 
1997-2002 period. We used the Mexican data to compute the capital share in value added 
and the mean wage rate of each sector, relative to all manufacturing, in order to use these as 
indicators of the physical and human capital intensity of each manufacturing activity.
38  
For this analysis, we divided the basket of competitors (not including China) into 
two groups: a High-Tech group, which includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South 
Korea, and a Low-Tech group, including the remaining countries. The criterion to do this 
separation was that the High-Tech countries are those that, given the estimates made for 
this study, currently have higher overall TFP levels in manufacturing than Mexico.  
Once we estimated the variables described above, we ran two sets of regressions, 
where each data point corresponds to the time-averaged values of the relevant variables for 
each of the 39 manufacturing sectors.
39 The first set of estimated equations related the log 
of Mexico’s revealed comparative advantages, relative to those of its competitors, with the 
log of the ratio of Mexico to its competitors’ sector-specific productivity levels and with the 
                                                 
36 See Amoroso, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009) for further details concerning the sources, methodology 
and results of this study.  
37 The number of distinct manufacturing industries had to be reduced to 39 in order to be able to match the 
information of different countries, which comes from different sources.  
38 We tested an extended Heckscher-Ohlin specification, in which we also included electricity and transport as 
additional factors of production. The variables intended to measure the intensity of these factors did not 
appear significantly in the regressions and did not lead to any qualitative change in the results. 
39 For the regressions in which we compare Mexico with China, we only consider the period after China 
entered the WTO for the RCA and market performance measures.    28
variables used to approximate the factor intensities in each sector. These regressions were 
run separately for i) Mexico vs. China; ii) Mexico vs. High-Tech competitors; and iii) 
Mexico vs. Low-Tech competitors.
40 The results are summarized in the first three columns 
of Table 2. The second group of regressions, which is summarized in the last three columns 
of the table, is similar, although in this case the dependent variable is a measure of relative 
export performance with respect to China or to a basket of competitors, defined as: 
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The results suggest that, when we compare Mexico with China, what drives relative 
comparative advantages and export performance are sector-specific productivity 
differentials. That is, according to the results, Mexico seems to have significantly larger 
revealed comparative advantage indexes and a better market performance, in both cases 
relative to China, in those sectors where its productivity differential with respect to China is 
larger. In contrast, the variables measuring capital and human capital intensities do not 
appear significantly in the regressions. In effect, we have a Ricardian-type explanation of 
these trade patterns. This could reflect the fact that, when we compare Mexico and China, 
we are considering two countries that have similar relative factor endowments. 
In contrast with the above, when we compare Mexico with the High-Tech basket, 
both productivity differentials and Heckscher-Ohlin determinants seem to explain relative 
comparative advantages and export performance. In effect, in combination with 
productivity differentials, the degree of physical and human capital intensity seem to be 
significant determinants of relative comparative advantages and market performance, 
respectively.
41 In particular, the results suggest that Mexico’s comparative advantages and 
export performance, when compared with competitors that have been able to “move up the 
ladder” towards higher skill-intensive goods, reflects both productivity differentials and the 
                                                 
40 Given the difficulty to obtain reliable data on capital stocks for China, in the regressions we used labor 
productivity differentials when comparing Mexico with China. For the high- and the low-tech baskets, we use 
TFP differentials in the regressions. A more complete set of results is found in Amoroso, Chiquiar and 
Ramos-Francia (2009). 
41 Human capital also seems to be a relevant determinant of relative comparative advantages, but its 
coefficient is estimated imprecisely in the RCA equation (its p-value is 0.11). In contrast, the physical capital 
variable only appears significantly in the RCA equation.    29
fact that Mexico may currently have a relatively smaller endowment of physical capital 
and, especially, of skilled labor, as compared with those countries.
42 This may in turn be 
reflecting the lower investment levels in physical and human capital that have been 
observed in Mexico during the past decades.
43  
 
Table 2. Determinants of Revealed Comparative Advantages and of 
Market Performance 
(Country Pair Comparisons)  
     
  
                                                 
42 Costinot (2007) suggests that institutional quality and human capital are complementary sources of 
comparative advantage in industries requiring more complex processes. It is important to emphasize again 
that, while human capital levels may be thought of as relevant determinants of trade patterns and of growth, 
they should be ultimately considered as endogenous to the incentives to invest in schooling and, in particular, 
to the institutional framework. Thus, even if the promotion of human capital accumulation may be an 
important policy to increase growth, the ultimate booster of development may be related to institutional 
reform (Vogel, 2006).     
43 Mexico's insufficient human capital formation is not only explained in terms of the relatively low average 
schooling attainment levels of its population, as depicted in Figure 13, but could also be a reflection of the 
relatively low quality of its schooling system. For instance, Mexico is ranked last within the OECD countries 
in terms of student performance, as measured by the OECD’s Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) tests. The low performance of Mexico’s students in these tests, as compared with all the 
other countries, stands out if we take into account that Mexico spends a comparable percentage of GDP in 
education as the average of OECD countries (see OECD, 2007a and 2007b). In this context, a misallocation 
of resources in the human capital investment sector may have a large impact on output levels; see Manuelli 
and Seshadri (2007). 
Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
0.8127*  0.5959* -0.0641 0.6839* 1.5588**  0.4355**
(2.02) (1.91) (-0.46) (1.91) (2.23) (2.08)
Capital Intensity  -1.7469  -3.8512** -1.5838 -2.2021 2.6201  -2.9644
(-1.10) (-2.04) (-1.07) (-1.49) (0.69) (-1.26)
Human Capital Intensity  0.0529  -0.6368 0.5748** -0.6523 -3.1257**  0.5100
(0.14) (-1.62) (2.15) (-1.44) (-2.68) (1.27)
Constant  -1.3017  1.4742** -0.4676 -0.3919 2.3414***  0.4256
(-1.52) (2.51) (-0.82) (-0.64) (2.81) (0.59)
R 
2 0.1696  0.1873 0.0946 0.1264 0.3725  0.2443
Adjusted  R 
2  0.0984  0.1176 0.0170 0.0516 0.3187  0.1795
Prob. F 0.0254  0.0299 0.1126 0.1961 0.0314  0.0880
Note: i=good, k=China, Basket L and Basket H respectively. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 or 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Amoroso, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009). 
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Summing up, the results from this study suggest that Mexico’s revealed 
comparative advantages and export performance, when compared to its main competitors, 
reflect productivity differentials and, in part, the relatively smaller endowment of physical 
and, especially, human capital in the country. This situation could become more 
pronounced in the future, if we note that Mexico tends to exhibit smaller TFP growth rates 
and has accumulated human capital at a slower pace than its competitors, especially those 
that have attained higher TFP levels (see Figure 13).
44  
Again, it is relevant to ask if this matters for growth. Given the arguments in 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007), it is indeed possible to think that this situation may 
be relevant for Mexico’s growth performance. According to these authors, a higher human 
capital intensity tends to be associated with goods that have larger growth effects and, in 
this context, precisely Hong Kong and South Korea, for example, seem to have an export 
mix that appears to be more conducive to growth than Mexico’s.  
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with Finished High School
Note: The values for the basket with low TFP corresponds to 
the weighted average of Malaysia, Turkey, Portugal, 
Philippines, Hungary, Thailand, Poland and Indonesia. The 
values for the basket with high TFP is the weighted average of 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Source: Barro-Lee 
(2000).

















                                                 
44 Some relevant countries’ TFP growth rates could not be included in the left panel of Figure 13, due to a 
lack of a sufficiently long data series to compute long-term TFP growth rates.   31
3.2.3   Competition, technology adoption and TFP growth 
A third study forming part of this research agenda (Salgado and Bernal, 2007) tried 
to identify the effect that product market competition may have on technology adoption and 
on TFP growth within Mexican manufacturing industries. In particular, TFP levels were 
estimated for each of 205 manufacturing activity classes and for each year from 1996 to 
2003. Technology adoption, in turn, was measured as the ratio of expenditures on 
technology transfer and royalties to value added. Finally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
was used as a measure of market concentration, which in turn is assumed to be inversely 
related to the degree of product market competition.
45  After computing these variables, a 
dynamic panel data GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) was applied to a model 
intended to explain the behavior of technology adoption and TFP growth. This method 
controls for time-invariant unobserved effects and for the possible endogeneity of 
regressors, and is appropriate when the lagged dependent variable appears as an 
explanatory variable.  
The results are summarized in Table 3. The first column corresponds to the equation 
for technology adoption, while the second summarizes the estimates of the equation for 
TFP growth. Note that the degree of market concentration in each sector is allowed to have 
both a direct effect on TFP growth (after controlling for technology adoption) and an 
indirect effect, which works through the impact that concentration may have on technology 
adoption, which in turn may have an impact on TFP growth. Controls for physical capital, 
human capital, electricity and transport intensities are included in the regressions as well.
46 
As may be noted, the results suggest that there seems to be a “Schumpeterian” type 
of effect of market concentration on technology adoption. Indeed, the coefficient of the 
concentration index in the technology adoption equation is significantly positive at a 5% 
                                                 
45 Concentration indexes, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index used here, could in some circumstances be 
misleading to assess the true degree of competition in the markets. In particular, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index cannot account for market segmentation or contestability (see Baumol et al., 1982), and is bounded by a 
geographic definition that might not be relevant if competition is exerted at an international level (see Aghion 
et al., 2005). This study is therefore currently being extended to analyze the robustness of the results to 
alternative measures of market competition. 
46 Note that the Sargan tests and the Difference Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions, as well as the m1 
and m2 tests for first and second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals, suggest that the 
instruments are valid and that the assumption that the levels equation error term does not present serial 
correlation is appropriate. Recall that this last assumption implies that one should find first-order serial 
correlation, and no evidence of second order serial correlation, in the differenced residuals. For further details, 
see Blundell and Bond (1998).   32
confidence level. This could suggest that competition in the product markets would seem to 
inhibit the incentives to technology adoption. However, once we look at the results on the 
second equation, it is clear that this is not the whole story. Indeed, the estimates suggest 
that, once controlling for expenses on technology adoption, which do seem to have a 
positive impact on TFP growth, the direct effect of market concentration on TFP growth is 
negative and quantitatively large. In fact, if we add up the direct and indirect effects of 
concentration on TFP growth, the results suggest that, on net, a larger market concentration 
is associated with lower TFP growth. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Technology Adoption and Productivity 
(Dynamic Panel Data) 
 
Source: Salgado and Bernal (2007). 
    TFP
Independent Variables:
Capital Intensity -0.025 * -1.510 ***
(-1.65) (-4.75)
Electricity Intensity 0.006 0.858
(0.18) (0.095)
Transport Intensity 0.017 -0.398
(1.13) (-1.11)
Technology Adoption 1.019 *
(1.85)
Concentration 0.027 ** -0.382 ***
(1.96) (-2.75)
Human Capital Intensity -0.002 0.119 **
(-0.47) (2.24)
TFP (-1) 0.792 ***
(18.3)










  p values. Corrected two-steps t-statistic in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 or 1 percent, respectively.




Thus, it is possible to conclude that, even if market concentration would appear to 
promote technology adoption, which in turn may have a positive impact on TFP growth, 
the additional side effects of market concentration on TFP growth, which could be related 
to allocative and productive inefficiencies, tend to offset this effect and, therefore,   33
apparently lead to an overall negative impact on growth. These results tend to be consistent 
with the findings in Nickell (1996), Okada (2005) and Aghion et al. (2005) and may have 
relevant policy implications. In particular, as in Aghion and Griffith (2005), the results 
suggest that limiting competition in the product markets may not be the most efficient 
mechanism to promote innovation.
47 In fact, the results would suggest that there are 
complementarities between patent protection policy (to promote innovation) and antitrust 
policy (to avoid the negative side effects of a lack of competition on growth). 
It is relevant to note that the results described above correspond mainly to the effect 
of market concentration on productivity in the case of product markets. As we will see in 
the next section, it seems that the lack of competition and its detrimental effects on 
productivity is an apparently even larger problem in the case of basic input markets.  
 
4   Some examples  
In this section, we briefly analyze the markets of some inputs that could be affecting 
significantly the competitiveness of the Mexican economy. In order to choose the specific 
sectors we illustrate, we used the results from a survey that Banco de México and the 
Secretaría de Economía conducted in 2007 within the group of firms that receive foreign 
direct investment flows (see Banco de México, 2007a). 202 firms, which contributed with 
close to 50% of foreign direct investment flows during 2007, responded the survey. Among 
other issues, these firms were asked to identify which cost components are relatively more 
expensive in Mexico than in other countries that compete with Mexico to attract 
investments. As we may observe in Figure 14, the main cost components in which Mexico 
appears to be most unfavorably rated correspond to banking and other financial services, 
telecommunications and electricity provision. We therefore briefly analyze some aspects of 
the markets of these three particular sectors in the following pages. 
It is important to note that these sectors tend to be characterized by relatively 
inelastic demand and supply functions, and exhibit many of the features of the so-called 
network industries (see Shy, 2001). In this context, it is usually an important challenge to 
achieve appropriate regulatory frameworks for this kind of sectors. In particular, in the 
                                                 
47 Boldrin and Levine (2008) show that, under certain assumptions, innovation activities can take place even 
in the complete absence of monopoly power.    34
absence of proper regulation, dominant suppliers in these sectors may capture a large share 
of the market, which allows them to offer the service at higher prices and lower quality.
48 
Indeed, the dominant suppliers may limit generalized access to inputs and exploit 
externalities that can be used to erect barriers to entry for other industry suppliers and to 
design strategies to extract rents at the expense of consumers and the competitiveness of 
industries using these inputs intensively. This makes the presence of a regulatory 
framework that avoids barriers of entry, guarantees non-discriminatory access to the 
network and induces competitive pricing, especially relevant.  
 
Figure 14. Production Costs in Mexico vs. Other Countries that Compete 
for FDI 
(% of Responses in which Mexico is more Expensive) 











































































































































































In this context it is clear that, to make deep assessments concerning the specific 
situation in each of these sectors, an integral study with much more detailed and exhaustive 
analyses would be needed. We bypass this need here by simply focusing on data from 
                                                 
48 While it is no longer the case that these sectors are generally thought to represent natural monopolies (in 
fact, in many countries competition in these sectors has been promoted; see Shy, 2001), it is still the case that 
the high level of fixed costs and, thus, of economies of scale, tend to lead to a high degree of concentration in 
these sectors.   35
official sources and international organizations, in order to make international comparisons 
of prices, quantities and qualities of service in these industries. This allows us to show that 
the differences between Mexico and other countries are large and clear enough to conclude 
that this country still seems to require undertaking important steps towards the achievement 
of a more competitive supply of these services. It is important to emphasize, however, that 
given the approach we take, the discussion should be taken only as illustrative.  
 
4.1   Banking sector 
A developed financial system and, in particular, a competitive supply of financial 
services to savers and borrowers, are fundamental factors for an efficient allocation of 
resources, which allows a country to converge to the technological frontier (see Aghion, 
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005) and to improve the population’s welfare by allowing 
households to smooth consumption paths and the purchase of physical assets. In this 
context, the evidence suggests that the development of the financial system promotes 
economic growth (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In the case of Mexico, diverse actions 
have been undertaken in the last few years to improve the regulatory framework of its 
financial sector. Among other actions to foster competition, we may highlight regulations 
intended to increase transparency concerning interest rates and commissions, to reduce 
barriers of entry of new banks and to ease access to payment systems’ networks for a larger 
number of market participants (see Comisión Federal de Competencia, 2007).
49  
Although in the last years significant improvements have been observed in terms of 
a higher penetration of financial services and a gradual decrease in market concentration, 
these still compare unfavorably with many other countries, including those with which 
Mexico competes more directly in the international markets (see Figure 15).
50 This lag calls 
for a renewed effort to guarantee a competitive supply of financial services in the country.  
The reduction that has been observed in banking operative costs and in interest rates 
paid to depositors, as a result of larger operation volume, operative efficiency gains and 
favorable macroeconomic conditions, were not fully reflected as improvements in credit 
conditions for borrowers and, in particular, as lower lending interest rates to households. 
                                                 
49 Comisión Federal de Competencia (COFECO) is Mexico’s antitrust agency.   
50 A more detailed set of figures related to the increase in penetration of financial services and the gradual 
decrease in market concentration, as well as diverse international comparisons, may be found in Comisión 
Federal de Competencia (2007).     36
Instead, the reduction in costs mostly led to increases of the system’s overall profitability 
margins. This is illustrated in Figures 16 and 17.  
 
Figure 15. Banking Sector Penetration and Market Concentration 
 
Private Credit by Deposit Money 
Banks in 2007
(% of GDP)
Market Concentration in 2007
(% of Assets Held by the 3 Largest
Banks)
Source: World Bank, A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. Revised in May 2009. For details

































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16. Banking Sector Prices 
*With data up to the second quarter of 2009.
Source: Banco de México and Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores.
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Regarding the behavior of prices, as shown in Figure 16, the persistently high 
effective interest rates for consumption credit, in a context of a decreasing cost of domestic 
funding by banks, have led to an increasing trend in the margin between these rates. On the 
one hand, the wide financial margin in consumption credit allowed banks to assume the risk 
of increasing penetration in the credit card market to segments of the population without 
previous credit history. On the other, households who enjoyed a loosening of the tight 
credit constraints they faced before were willing to pay high interest rates.
51 Up to 2006, the 
total banks’ financial margin revenues were increasing, even when adjusting the figures for 
risk. Nonetheless, even before the deterioration of the financial conditions in September 
2008, higher delinquency rates and write-offs contributed to reduce the risk-adjusted 
financial margin revenues.
52 In addition to high margins, banks have also enjoyed 
increasing markups for the services provided. In effect, as illustrated in the figure, net 
commissions revenue as a percentage of operational costs increased substantially until 
2007.  
Figure 17, in turn, summarizes an international comparison of the profitability and 
the operative efficiency of banking systems. As mentioned, the trends described above have 
led to high profitability margins, which have risen in the last few years to levels well above 
international standards. As may be seen in the figure, the extraordinarily high profitability 
of the Mexican banking system stands out, despite its relatively low efficiency levels, when 
compared to those observed in many other countries.
53  
The combination of low penetration and high price of services, profitability and 
concentration levels, led Mexico’s antitrust agency to issue an opinion concerning the 
apparent lack of competition in the market for retail banking services (see Comisión 
Federal de Competencia, 2007).
54 According to this document, this lack of competition, in 
turn, reflects several distortions: 
                                                 
51 Obviously, the relationship between the financial margin and the risk undertaken works in both directions 
and a higher portfolio risk also implies wider interest rate spreads.  
52 The risk adjusted financial margin is the financial margin adjusted by the change in the estimate for 
preventive credit risk. 
53 Other countries where we also observe high profitability, in a context of relatively low efficiency, are Brazil 
and Peru.  
54 According to Claessens and Laeven (2003), the degree of entry restrictions, and not market structure or 
profitability measures, is what determines the competitiveness of the financial markets. Similar conclusions as 
those of the COFECO are reached if a contestable markets approach is used, however. See Avalos and 
Hernandez Trillo (2006).   38
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a)  On the demand side, the degree of heterogeneity of services and, in particular, 
the banks’ strategy of offering heavily differentiated products and complex cost 
structures, makes it difficult for customers to compare the effective price of the 
services offered by banks. Furthermore, the presence of switching costs restricts 
the ability of customers to take advantage of cost differentials, even in cases 
when these differentials can be identified. These features may cause the demand 
in some segments of the market to exhibit a relatively low price elasticity and, 
thus, may lead financial intermediaries to set high markups.  
 
b)  On the supply side, an oligopolistic structure persists in several market 
segments. This, in turn, may reflect barriers to entry, and may be facilitating the 
exercise of monopolistic practices in detriment of the consumers’ welfare. 
Additionally, an important limitation to competition that persists is the 
discriminatory access to the low-value payment system infrastructure, in 
detriment of small and new players in the system.
 55  
                                                 
55 A payment system is a set of instruments, banking procedures and interbank transfer systems that allow the 
circulation of money. These systems are classified as high-value systems and low-value or retail systems. The   39
Indeed, the apparent presence of barriers to entry, along with the low price elasticity 
that customers exhibit in some market segments, appear to be fundamental factors affecting 
competitiveness in the market. In particular, the lack of competition, as manifested through 
high concentration of the main players and high prices to customers, is especially evident in 
market segments where the participation of non-bank intermediaries is more limited, and 
where consumers may be less price-elastic.
56 As can be seen in Figure 18, the degree of 
market concentration and the level of borrowing costs are substantially higher in the credit 
card market, where these non-bank intermediaries have not yet entered as relevant 
competitors, than in the mortgage and automobile credit markets, where they have 
represented a larger competitive pressure to banks and consumers may have larger 
incentives to compare thoroughly prices and conditions, thus exhibiting a larger price 
elasticity.
57  
Reflecting the diagnosis summarized above, COFECO’s opinion included a series 
of recommendations that intend to act on these market imperfections: i) actions to improve 
transparency and facilitate the comparison of different products (compulsory introduction 
of standardized savings and payments products, the inclusion of cost information in the 
statements of account, the implementation of frame contracts for the most common 
products, etc.); ii) actions to reduce switching costs (compulsory unrestricted offer of bill 
payment services, the establishment of rules that allow employees to transfer their payroll 
deposits to the bank of their choice, among others); iii) actions to diminish barriers of entry 
(a reduction of the minimum capital required to open a bank and decoupling this minimum 
capital from the size of the banking system); and, iv) actions to guarantee a non-
                                                                                                                                                     
high value systems are mainly used to liquidate transactions between financial institutions. In these systems 
Banco de México has taken measures to reduce transaction fees and to open access to the system to non-bank 
financial institutions. Low-value or retail payment systems are used to liquidate transactions between 
individuals and firms and individuals, mainly checks, electronic transfers and payment cards (credit and 
debit). One of the main obstacles to competition in the low-value system is the vertical integration of the 
payment card switches (compensation chambers) with banks, which has generated discriminatory access to 
the use of the network between partners and non partners. 
56 The most important non-bank intermediaries are Sofoles and Sofomes. Sofoles correspond to financial 
institutions with a limited scope. In particular, they may only offer specific types of credit, such as for 
automobile or home purchases. This figure was created in June of 1992. The Sofomes figure, created in 2006, 
has a broader scope for credit provision and a lower regulatory burden. In fact, a migration of Sofoles towards 
the newly defined Sofome figure has been taking place and is expected to continue in the future. Given their 
broader scope, Sofomes may eventually become more helpful to enhance competition in the retail market of 
financial intermediation. 
57 Avalos and Hernandez Trillo (2006) also find an apparent lack of competition in the credit card segment 
and a higher degree of competition in the mortgage and automobile credit markets.   40
discriminatory access to the financial system’s network (implementing regulation that 
guarantees non-discriminatory access to low-value payment systems, reinforcing 




Figure 18. Concentration, Prices and Sofoles Share in Consumer Credit 
Market, 2006 
Notes: Concentration corresponds to the market share of the two main competitors (CR2). Prices are total annual

























After COFECO’s opinion, issued on April 2007, and along the lines of its 
recommendations, the legal framework that regulates bank competition and the protection 
of customers has undergone several amendments, such as the ones included in the Ley para 
la Transparencia y Ordenamiento de los Servicios Financieros (LTOSF).
59 The current 
legal framework now provides Banco de México with enhanced authority to promote 
competition in banking services. Banks are now required to inform Banco de México about 
any changes in commissions and fees charged for their services before their 
implementation. 
                                                 
58 Further details may be found in Comisión Federal de Competencia (2007).   
59 The LTOSF is similar to U.S.’s Truth in Lending Act. Additional amendments were made to the Ley de 
Instituciones de Crédito (law governing credit institutions), Ley de Protección y Defensa al Usuario de 
Servicios Financieros (law on protection and defense to the users of financial services) and the Ley de la 
Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (law governing the National Banking and Securities Comission).   41
Reflecting the reforms to the sector, several actions have been undertaken to reduce 
distortions on the demand side and to increase substitutability between financial services. 
First, when agents have no complete and transparent information about the actual services 
received and their respective costs, their ability to compare between different products is 
hindered. In this respect, Banco de México has been adopting a series of measures to 
promote transparency and improve the available information about prices and 
commissions.
60 It is now compulsory for banks to publish, by different means, information 
about the costs of their products in a standardized fashion to facilitate comparison between 
bank products with different cost structures.
61 In the credit card market the different risk 
profiles generate a wide dispersion of interest rates. To improve transparency and facilitate 
comparison of these rates, Banco de México is publishing information on the distribution of 
credit cards’ interest rates by financial intermediary. A related measure to facilitate 
comparison between heterogeneous deposit products was to require banks to offer 
standardized payroll and current accounts, with a reduced number of commissions to the 
low income population.  
Second, enhancing the possibility of customers to substitute between providers of 
banking services also requires a reduction in switching costs. Thus, other reforms have 
been aimed to prevent practices that can increase these costs. For capital amortization, 
interests, commissions and other fees, credit institutions must receive unrestricted means of 
payment, including cash, cleared checks, and transfers from other banks. This measure 
reduces the possibility of banks to force customers asking for credit to purchase deposit 
services. An additional switching cost that prevailed was in payroll accounts, where 
employers chose the provider of the service, while employees faced a cost of changing their 
resources to other bank. In this respect, the portability of the payroll was implemented, and 
employees are now allowed to transfer their resources, without a fee, to the bank of their 
choice. Finally, Banco de México issued regulation explicitly forbidding fees that deterred 
                                                 
60 For detailed information of some of the measures undertaken, see Banco de México (2007b, 2008, 2009a 
and 2009b).  
61 For each credit product, banks and other credit intermediaries must publish their Costo Anual Total (CAT). 
CAT is estimated with the same methodology than the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of the United 
Kingdom. The published costs should use the relevant information for each specific purpose: in advertising, 
the interest rate used for the calculation of the CAT is the average of the product, while for contracts and 
statements of accounts it should be customized.    42
customer mobility:  banks cannot charge fees for the cancellation of deposit accounts, credit 
and debit cards, internet banking services and direct debits. 
On a related issue, Banco de México established regulation to define in a clearer 
way some property rights and eliminate some inappropriate practices about fees and 
commissions in retail banking. Basically, customers must be charged only for services 
actually received and there cannot be double fees for a single service.
62  
Other measures have been undertaken to enhance competition by acting on the 
supply side, in particular by lowering entry barriers. With respect to entry of new 
competitors, the minimum capital requirements for new banks were reduced and decoupled 
from the size of the banking system. Two additional measures directed to foster entry are 
the new figures of specialized banks and of “Comisionistas Bancarios”. Specialized banks, 
(“banco de nicho”) may increase the potential spectrum of competitors in some financial 
products.
63 The figure of Comisionista Bancario or Bank Agent, corresponds to a third 
party allowed to carry out, on behalf of banks, functions of deposit, withdrawal, payments 
of bills and credits, and to furnish information about account statements and movements. 
Bank Agents could increase competition in basic financial services by widening their 
provision at lower costs. 
Since 2005, Banco de México has taken several measures to reduce entry barriers in 
the high value payment system’s network. The Mexican central bank widened the 
accessibility to the Interbank Electronic Payment System (Sistema de Pagos Electrónicos 
Interbancarios, SPEI). In particular, regulation was implemented to reduce transactions fees 
and to open access to the system to non-bank financial institutions. Nonetheless, it is in the 
low-value payment systems and, in particular, in the systems for credit and debit cards, 
where problems of discriminatory access persist. On the one hand, there are high discount 
rates to business and interbank fees that benefit larger banks.
64 On the other hand, the 
                                                 
62 Customers cannot be charged fees: i) for the deposit of a returned check (the cost is already charged by the 
check issuer); ii) for exceeding or attempting to exceed his debit card balance (the bank is then responsible for 
preventing this); iii) simultaneously for account management and for holding balances below the minimum; 
iv) by the two banks involved when cash is withdrawn using an automatic teller machine of a bank different 
than the issuer of the card. 
63 As these intermediaries will receive deposits and have access to the payment systems, they will have to 
comply with the same regulatory standards than banks. 
64 A bank owner of the Point-of-Sale Terminals (the acquiring bank) charge discount rates to the business 
affiliated as a percentage of the receipts signed by card holders in that terminal. The bank that issues the 
payment card used charges the acquiring bank an interbank fee (cuota de intercambio) for each transaction.   43
existing card switches are owned by banks, creating incentives to impose entry barriers to 
the use of the network by non-members.
65 Among the measures undertaken by Banco de 
México are the publication of the maximum discount rates by financial institution and the 
participation, with the Association of Mexican Banks (ABM), in the revision of interbank 
fees to promote a greater use of these means of payment.  Currently there is an initiative in 
Congress aimed to regulate competition practices of card switches.   
In an additional measure in the low-value payment system, Banco de México, 
together with other financial authorities, issued regulations for new types of sight deposit 
accounts known as “Simplified File Accounts” (Mobile Accounts), to promote access to 
banking services through cellular phones. The lower cost of mobile transfers, compared 
with checks and debit and credit card payments, may induce more competition in the retail 
payment system.  
Although over the last two years there has been important progress in reforming the 
regulatory framework to improve competition of financial services in retail banking, some 
distortions persist that hamper its efficient functioning, particularly in the case of credit 
cards. In this context, Comisión Federal de Competencia (2009) presented additional 
proposals aimed to enhance competition in this market. Among these proposals are: i) to 
reduce restrictions for customers willing to switch institutions (further improve 
transparency, establish standardized procedures for transferring accounts and allow the 
recipient bank to act on behalf of the customer); ii) to guarantee competitive access to 
infrastructure networks, in particular in the low-value payment systems (forbid vertical 
integration of banks with credit and debit cards switches and credit bureaus); iii) to 
encourage competitive interbank fees (make the methodologies and parameters used to 
establish those fees public); and, iv) to eliminate unnecessary requirements about minimum 
branch networks. In addition, to deter monopolistic and collusive practices, COFECO 
proposes to modify sanctions in line with international practices. Higher sanctions 
established as a significant proportion of total revenues for the offender institution can deter 
monopolistic practices. For the latter case, the proposal is to prosecute the persons involved 
in collusion agreements. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Discount rates are determined by each acquiring bank and have as a floor the interbank fee. Interbank fees are 
mutually agreed upon by banks participating in the card market. 
65 The card switches are the compensation chambers for the transactions done with credit and debit cards.   44
Finally, a comprehensive assessment of competition in the Mexican banking system 
needs some final considerations about the resilience that this system has shown in the 
current episode of the global financial crisis. Despite restrictive global financial conditions, 
the adverse economic situation in Mexico and the significant increase in write-offs and loan 
loss reserves, banks have maintained high capitalization levels, well above those required 
by regulation, and have continued generating profits (see Figure 19).
66 Moreover, even 
when foreign financial institutions own or have a majority stake in a large number of banks 
established in México, and some of these parent companies have experienced huge losses, 
the solvency of the banks in México have not been threatened. Among the factors that may 
have contributed to this resilience are:  
i)  Banks in Mexico, like in other emerging economies, had limited exposure to 
toxic assets. The high margins that the banks enjoy in traditional credit products 
reduced incentives to search for higher yields in more sophisticated financial 
products. In addition, in general, global financial groups tend to concentrate 
local risks in their subsidiaries in other countries. Finally, securitization in 
Mexico was at early stages and the level of financial sophistication was lower 
than in more advanced economies. 
ii)  The prudential regulation in place contributed greatly to safeguard the banking 
system. There are regulations to prevent currency mismatches by penalizing 
short term funding in foreign currency and by limiting uncovered foreign 
currency positions in the bank balances. With regard to ownership, Mexico has 
not allowed foreign banks to operate as branches but only as subsidiaries, 
separating their legal personality from the one of their parent banks.
67 Mexican 
legislation places very strict limits on transactions between banks established in 
Mexico and their parent companies.
 68  
                                                 
66 Since the fourth quarter of 2008, the risk adjusted financial margin revenues have continued decreasing, as 
a result, among others, of: i) higher write-offs and delinquency rates; ii) a contraction of consumption credit, 
that has a higher interest rate; and iii) a substitution of credit in favor of larger firms, which pay smaller 
interest rates premiums. 
67 This separation is particularly relevant in protecting the subsidiaries creditors and depositors’ rights in the 
event of a bankruptcy. 
68 The regulation identifies parent companies as a related party and limits related transactions to a maximum 
of 50 percent of net Tier 1 capital. Related transactions refer to all deposits, loans or credit, including net 
positions in favor of the institution from derivative transactions, as well as investments in securities other than 
stock.   45
iii)  Finally, it is possible that the high margins the banks enjoy had provided them 
with an extraordinary buffer to absorb shocks.  
 














































































Source: Banco de México. *For 2009, the correspond to the flows of the last twelve 
months at June.


































































Trading and Other Revenues





The last factor brings into account the discussion of a possible trade-off between 
competition and financial stability. The basic idea underlying this trade-off is that profits 
could provide a buffer against financial fragility and that greater bank competition may 
reduce margins and give incentives to individual banks to take on more risk.
69 Although 
there are no definite answers, neither theoretical nor empirical, about the effect of 
competition on banking stability, it is difficult to justify on stability grounds the persistence 
of a non-competitive banking system. In the first place, market power does not guarantee 
financial stability. Indeed, in a heavily concentrated banking system, “too big to fail” 
financial institutions may intensify risk-taking incentives and increase fragility. Secondly, 
although banking crises generate high costs, they are infrequent, while concentration and 
                                                 
69 For a review of the literature on competition and financial fragility see Carletti and Hartmann (2003), and 
Beck (2008).   46
lack of competition generates a continuous efficiency loss in terms of productivity and 
growth. Finally, and more importantly, whether bank competition results in financial 
fragility or not is fundamentally related with the appropriateness of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework in place. 
 
4.2   Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
Another relevant market where an apparent lack of competitive conditions seems to 
be detrimental for the overall productivity of the Mexican economy corresponds to the 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. As we will see below, when 
comparing Mexico with international standards, in this sector we again observe a 
combination of high concentration of incumbent providers, high prices and low penetration 
of some relevant services, such as broadband.
70 According to the World Bank (2006a), the 
overall non-competitive situation of this sector is apparently related with a weak regulatory 
framework and, in particular, with the lack of independence and enforceability powers of 
COFETEL, Mexico's telecommunications sector regulator. Indeed, the current institutional 
framework does not seem to be dismantling barriers of entry and discrimination in the 
access to the telecommunications network. This situation is especially worrisome if we 
consider the relevance that the ICT sector has in the efficient allocation of resources, the 
alleviation of poverty, the accountability and transparency of government, the diffusion of 
knowledge and economic growth (see Jorgenson and Vu, 2005; World Bank, 2006b; 
Jensen, 2007).  
 Concerning market concentration, Figure 20 illustrates an international comparison 
of the market share of the dominant firms in the fixed and mobile telephone services.
71 
According to these figures, the dominant player in each of these markets in Mexico has a 
larger market share than the shares observed in other countries. This may be suggestive of 
high market power and a lack of competition in these markets within Mexico.  
 
 
                                                 
70 A more detailed analysis of the features of the Mexican ICT sector and of its comparison with other 
countries than the one made here may be found in Del Villar (2009) and World Bank (2006a) and the 
references therein.  
71 In the case of Mexico, TELMEX and TELCEL (which belong to the same entrepreneurial group) are the 
relevant dominant suppliers in these two markets, respectively.   47






































































Market Share of the Leading Firm in 
Fixed Telephone Industry
(% of Lines in 2006)
Market Share of the Leading Firm in 
Mobile Telephone Industry  
(% of Total Subscriptions in 2008)
Source: Companies Websites: BSNL India, Magyar 
Telecom, Telefónica, Telemar, Telmex; International 
Telecommunication Union; SEC; Subtel; Yahoo Finance 



































































































































































Source: Bank of America and Merrill Lynch (2009). 
 
 
Market power, in turn, may be allowing the incumbent firms to charge relatively 
high prices.
72 To illustrate this, Figure 21 exhibits international comparisons of annual total 
costs of the OECD basket for business fixed-line telephone services.
73 As may be noted, 
Mexico's provision of these services is especially expensive, when compared to most other 
OECD countries. Similar results are obtained if international comparisons are made for 
mobile service rates or for other telecommunication services (see OECD, 2007c; Bank of 
America and Merrill Lynch, 2009). According to World Bank (2006a), these high prices 
may lead to an especially high profitability of incumbent firms. Indeed, according to this 
document, TELMEX´s profitability margins not only exceed twice the levels recorded by 
its closest competitors, but are also significantly above those observed in other countries.  
 
                                                 
72 It is important to mention that, internationally, prices of telecommunication services exhibit a significant 
downward trend, reflecting the fast pace of technological improvements in processing and transmission 
capacity, as well as in the costs of network equipment and development. Mexico has indeed experienced 
reductions in the prices of these services in the last years. However, as seen in the main text, price levels still 
compare unfavorably with those of other countries. 
73 The OECD constructs several fixed-line and mobile telephony consumption baskets in order to be able to 
compare price levels of telecommunications services across OECD countries in terms of a standardized basket 
of services.     48
Figure 21. Annual Cost of OECD’s Business Fixed-Line Basket 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Small and Medium-Sized Firms Small Office and Home Office 
 
 
Finally, concerning the low penetration of services in Mexico, as compared to the 
rest of the world, the case of broadband should be highlighted. As is well known, 
broadband is the most efficient and less costly platform to carry voice, video and data.
74  Its 
penetration has important implications not only for spreading knowledge, but also for the 
creation of business opportunities and for improving the economy’s competitiveness. As a 
consequence, broadband access is increasingly used as an indicator of the level of 
development of the ICT sector (World Bank, 2006a).
75  In this context, Figure 22 compares 
                                                 
74 Broadband refers to the transmission of data in which various pieces of information are sent simultaneously 
in order to increase the effective transmission speed. The term is also used when two or more signals share the 
same transmission medium. Broadband is traditionally associated with speeds above 128 kilobits per second. 
Unlike narrowband or dial-up access, broadband allows surfing the web and making telephone calls 
simultaneously, as well as watching video and carrying out other activities that require a high-speed 
connection.  
75 We highlight the case of broadband because of its current relevance within the ICT market. This does not 
mean that, in other services, Mexico exhibits penetration levels that are comparable to other countries. In fact, 
Mexico tends to exhibit relatively slow increases in the introduction of telecommunication services and, thus, 
currently small penetration levels, even in more basic products. For example, according to the World Bank 
(2006c), Mexico has around 150 telephone mainlines per 1,000 persons. This is half the penetration observed 
in the East Asian region and a third of the one observed in the European countries described in the first part of 
this study. This stands out if we note that current mainline penetration in Mexico is 5 times larger than the one 
observed in the 70´s, when Mexico’s penetration was similar to that of the Asian countries. Thus, the pace in 
which the Mexican population has been gaining access to telecommunication services, although high, has 
been clearly below the one observed in other countries.     49
the recent growth and current penetration of broadband in Mexico with the rest of the 
OECD. Broadband penetration in Mexico, when measured as the number of subscribers per 
100 persons, is the lowest among this group of countries.
76 This may in part reflect the fact 
that, according to the literature, Mexico has been exhibiting low levels of investment in 
information technology (even after adjusting for per-capita income levels) and, in 
particular, has not followed the trend observed in most other countries of the world, in 
which investment in information technology has increased significantly during the last 
decade (see the evidence provided by Jorgenson and Vu (2005) and World Bank (2006a 
and 2006b). 
In turn, as already mentioned, the abovementioned could be reflecting weaknesses 
of the regulatory framework, which are apparently allowing dominant players in the 
markets to erect barriers of entry and, thus, avoid a more generalized use of the most 
advanced technologies. Indeed, recent technological advances allow convergence in the 
provision of voice, data and video services. This could be a worthwhile opportunity for 
these services to be provided under more competitive conditions. In order to capitalize 
these benefits, however, an efficient regulatory framework that avoids dominant firms 
owning the network to restrict access is needed.  
Indeed, the enactment of reforms that promote competition in the 
telecommunications sector would clearly have positive effects on the competitiveness of 
the economy. According to the World Bank (2006a), several actions could be implemented 
in this direction. In particular, an enhancement of the credibility, efficacy, independence 
and transparency of COFETEL, and regulatory changes that eliminate barriers of entry and 
guarantee a generalized and non discriminatory access to the network, are fundamental 
ingredients of an integral strategy to enhance competition in the sector and boost the use of 
efficient telecommunications services. In this context, it is especially important to avoid 
that the dominant players in the market form monopolies with the newly available 
technologies, such as Wireless Fidelity (WiFi), Power Line Communications (PLC), Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL) and VoIP, among others.  
 
                                                 
76  According to the OECD (2007c), Mexico not only exhibits a low penetration of broadband services. The 
speed ranges and price levels of its broadband service also compare unfavorably with most other OECD 
countries.   50
Figure 22. Broadband Subscribers 
































































































































































































































































































Finally, another sector that seems to be affecting the competitiveness of Mexico's 
industry is electricity.
78 As we may note in Figure 23, since year 2000, the prices charged 
for electrical energy to the industrial sector in Mexico have risen above the prices charged 
to U.S. industry.
79 Moreover, electricity price levels for industry in Mexico are not only 
currently higher than those observed in the U.S., but also compare unfavorably with those 
charged in many other countries.
80  
                                                 
77 This section is based on Martínez Chombo (2009).  
78 Until September 2009, the electricity sector in Mexico was fundamentally composed by two state-owned 
firms: Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC). CFE generated most of 
the electricity and supplied and distributed it across the country, with the exception of the Federal District and 
some municipalities within the States of Mexico, Hidalgo, Puebla and Morelos, where the distribution was in 
charge of LyFC. On October 10, 2009, fundamentally as a response to the inefficiencies described in this 
section, the government shut down LyFC by presidential decree, immediately starting its liquidation process. 
The electricity distribution of Mexico City’s metro area was temporarily handed over to CFE. Up to the date 
of this writing, the government has not decided if it will permanently merge the operations of LyFC with CFE 
or incorporate a new state enterprise under a radically different scheme of incentives. 
79 The price levels in Figure 23 are computed as the ratio of the value of electricity sales to the quantity of 
energy sold. These figures do not include additional costs, such as those related to the connection to the 
electrical network, and do not adjust for international differences in the quality of service.  
80 According to data from CFE and the U.S. Energy Information Administration concerning electricity tariffs 
in Mexico and U.S. bordering states, the relative difference between prices to commercial customers in 
Mexico seems to be even higher than in the case of industrial customers (the data supporting this is available   51
 
Figure 23. Mean Electricity Prices, Industrial Sector  























































































































































































Source: International Energy Agency / OECD (2008); 
Presidencia de la República (2006); Comisión Federal 
de Electricidad (CFE): www.cfe.gob.mx; Energy
Information Administration (EIA): http://eia.doe.gov/
Source: International Energy Agency / OECD (2008).
 
 
The distinct behavior exhibited recently by electricity prices in Mexico and in the 
U.S. reflects, in part, the fact that the prevailing technology in each country uses different 
inputs, which prices have had a different evolution in the past few years. In particular, 
Mexico’s electricity is generated mostly in combined-cycle and steam turbine power plants, 
based on the use of natural gas and fuel oil, respectively. According to the International 
Energy Agency, the prices of these inputs have increased substantially since year 2000, as 
compared with the price of coal, which is the main primary fuel used by U.S. electricity 
generation technology.  
Other factors related with the structure of Mexico’s electricity sector, however, also 
seem to be affecting its price levels and their recent increases, as compared with the U.S. 
Two such factors stand out: i) the high level and recent increases of labor costs, in a context 
of low labor productivity levels; and, ii) the gradual increase in energy losses related to 
                                                                                                                                                     
from the authors upon request). In contrast, electricity prices to households in Mexico are among the lowest 
within the OECD. This reflects the existence of cross-subsidies across different types of customers in Mexico. 
Given this price structure and the fact that industrial prices in Mexico are above those in other countries, it is 
possible to argue that both industrial and commercial customers are truly cross-subsidizing households’ 
electricity consumption in Mexico. This evidently affects the competitiveness of Mexico's industrial sector.    52
illicit uses of energy (non-technical losses).
81 These factors, in turn, tend to be related 
respectively with the well known bargaining power of the electricity workers’ unions and 
with ambiguities in terms of the public institution in charge of enforcing the law 
sanctioning illegal uses of electricity.
82 This, in a context in which, reflecting the growth of 
the informal sector and the construction of new housing projects, these illegal uses have 
grown substantially in Mexico City.
83   
Concerning labor costs, it is important to highlight that, apparently as a result of 
their collective bargaining power, electricity workers have not only been among the highest 
paid in the country, but their wages have also tended to exhibit consistently larger yearly 
increases, as compared to the rest of the economy (see Figure 24). Two additional factors 
exacerbate this situation: 
First, high wages to active employees have not been the only relevant concept 
affecting labor costs of electricity firms. Additional benefits provided to current employees 
and to retired workers are also higher than in other sectors of the economy. This was more 
dramatic for the now extinct LyFC, where the value of benefits to retired workers tended to 
increase in tandem with the wages and benefits of active employees. 
Second, productivity levels in the industry have been extremely low by international 
standards and, furthermore, have not exhibited trends that match the recent increases 
exhibited by wages. Indeed, a comparison of the ratios of energy sold or of the number of 
users of the electricity sector to the number of electricity workers in Mexico with those 
observed in diverse Latin American electricity firms, such as those in Chile and Brazil, 
suggests that, if Mexico’s firms worked with the same productivity standards as firms in 
                                                 
81 Even when, on average, the prices charged to customers are well above international standards, the 
electricity industry receives a transfer from the federal government to cover up its high operating costs. 
82 Given the relatively better performance in terms of labor productivity and non-technical losses of CFE over 
LyFC, the recent shut down of the latter could ameliorate both of these factors. 
83 The law (Ley de Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica) establishes specific sanctions to illicit uses of 
electricity, which go from fines to the suppression of service, and specifies that the Secretaría de Hacienda 
and the Secretaría de Energía should be in charge of this enforcement. LyFC, however, would have been a 
natural enforcer, in terms of its higher capability of identifying informal activities that steal electricity through 
illegal connections to the public network and new housing projects that do not comply with a legal purchase 
of electricity. In this context, it is the lack of coordination between the different public institutions what seems 
to be allowing the recent growth of illegal uses of electricity.    53




Figure 24. Mean Daily Wages Registered at IMSS 
(Current Pesos)  




















Furthermore, as may be observed in Table 4, the productivity of electricity workers 
in Mexico, when measured with the ratio of energy sold to the number of workers, 
increased around 5% in 2001-2008. Similarly, if productivity is measured by the number of 
                                                 
84 For example, in terms of the distribution segment, if in 2005 LyFC and CFE had worked with the standards 
of Colombia’s firm EMCALI (a state owned company with one of the best labor productivity in Latin 
America), they would have been able to attain the same energy sales with 44% and 25% less employees, 
respectively.  In an extreme case, if these Mexican firms worked with the productivity standards of CGE (a 
Chilean private firm with one of the best labor productivity in Latin America), their over-employment levels 
would seem to be around 67% and 57% respectively. The data for these calculations are base on information 
collected by World Bank, Benchmarking Database of the Electricity Distribution Sector in the Latin America 
and Caribbean Region 1995-2005 (http://info.worldbank.org/etools/lacelectricity/home.htm). Similarly, in the 
generation segment, CFE’s productivity levels also compare unfavorably with the performance of other Latin 
American electric companies. For example, when comparing the energy generated and the capacity installed 
per worker of CFE with the Latin American branches of the Spanish company ENDESA, the productivity of 
CFE seems to be at least 60% lower than that of ENDESA. The data for these calculations are based on 
information from CFE, LyFC, ENERSIS (http://www.enersis.cl/enersis_web/action.asp?id=21760) and 
ENDESA (http://www.endesa.cl/Endesa_Chile/action.asp?id=00010&lang=esand). These calculations are 
available from the authors upon request. See also Andres, Foster and Guasch (2006) for an analysis of the 
impact of privatization on the productivity levels of diverse electric utilities in Latin American countries. 
According to this study, on average, decreases of more than 40% in the number of electricity employees of 
the analyzed firms were observed in the first five years after privatization.    54
users of the industry per worker, it only increased by 20%. In contrast, the real wage of 
electricity workers increased in this period by more than 40%. 
Turning to the second topic, energy losses correspond to energy that is produced by 
electricity firms but is not charged for. While part of these losses are due to technical 
factors that, to some extent, occur naturally in the transmission of electricity (the so-called 
technical losses), another part is related to electricity theft derived from the alteration of 
electricity use measurement devices or from illicit connections to the network (non-
technical losses).  
 
Table 4. Labor Productivity and Real Wages in the Mexican Electricity 
Industry 
(Annual Growth Rate) 
 
* Real wages correspond to the daily average of the IMSS quotation wage deflacted by the CPI.
** Energy Sold and Users from CFE, Number of total workers from CFE and LyFC. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Presidencia de la República (2006), Comisión Nacional de Salarios 
Mínimos, using IMSS data http://www.conasami.gob.mx, Comisión Federal de Electricidad 
http://www.cfe.gob.mx and "Segundo Informe de Labores 2007-2008" and Luz y Fuerza del Centro 
http://www.lfc.gob.mx/. 
Energy Sold / Users / Real Wage*
Number of Workers Number of Workers
2001 -2.19 0.58 11.01
2002 -0.67 1.45 7.24
2003 0.75 4.87 4.29
2004 0.53 2.44 3.59
2005 3.61 3.33 2.92
2006** 1.73 1.71 3.78
2007** 2.11 3.44 4.07
2008** -0.96 1.04 1.08
00-08 4.89 20.40 44.49
 
 
In this context, as may be noted in Figure 25, Mexico’s energy losses, as a 
percentage of total energy handled, compare unfavorably with other countries. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned before non-technical losses have increased substantially 
in the last years, especially in the regions that were attended by LyFC, where Mexico City 
stands out.
85 These losses have a direct impact on the costs of electricity provision and are 
                                                 
85 The methodology used to obtain the figures related to losses due to illicit energy uses is available from the 
authors upon request.   55
eventually charged either to electricity consumers, through higher prices, and/or to 
taxpayers, through larger budgetary transfers to the sector.   
 




Different Countries, 2006  (%)
Source: International Energy Agency / OECD (2008).
Losses due to Ilicit Energy Uses 









Note: Data refers to “Non-technical” losses and includes   
alteration to energy meters, illegal connections to the 
network, altered invoicing and consumption error reading.
Source: Estimations based on data from Presidencia de la 
República (2006); LyFC, Informe de Labores (several years); 
LyFC, Informe de Autoevaluación (2005); CFE, POISE 2005-





























































































































































































It is finally important to highlight the fact that high prices are not the only factor 
related to the electricity sector that may be affecting the competitiveness of Mexico’s 
industrial activities. These are also facing indirect costs related to the overall low quality 
service that the electrical industry provides. Indeed, 54% of the FDI firms surveyed in 2007 
expressed that they frequently suffer abrupt voltage changes or energy interruptions (see 
Banco de México, 2007a). This implies for these firms the need to incur in diverse 
additional costs, such as those related to the purchase of electrical plants or energy 
regulators, the losses of continuity in production processes and of information and the costs 
of replacement or repair of damaged equipment (see Figure 26). 
Given the results above, it is clear that an effort to reduce the cost of electricity and 
to improve the quality of this industry’s service is urgent.
86 Although these kinds of 
                                                 
86 The recent liquidation of LyFC should be a step in the right direction provided that the replacing entity, 
CFE or other, operate under an incentive scheme driven by gains in efficiency and productivity.   56
problems of the electricity sector have been evident since the last decade, the energy reform 
of November 2008 did not consider the electricity sector. Some of the needed reforms in 
such sector are to enhance the transparency of CFE, emphasize the accounting separation 
between segments and business areas to strengthen their accountability (at least to its 
functional parts -generation, transmission, distribution and commercialization-, and the new 
telecommunication business area) and to adopt better corporate governance practices. 
Transparency policies, as well as the establishment of rules that allow a clearer link 
between wages and productivity, should be applied to the electricity workers’ union.
87 
 
Figure 26. Electricity Service Quality 
Source: Banco de México (2007a).
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The energy sector is an example where, given recent technological advances, 
regulatory changes could be made in order to achieve a more efficient use of the public 
                                                 
87 A policy focused on reducing the costs and increasing productivity of the electricity industry would 
necessarily go through the challenges of: i) reducing energy losses; ii) reconsidering the organizational 
structure of the sector (e.g. analyzing the convenience of separating the control of the grid and the dispatch); 
iii) making efforts to attain a more diversified generation segment, in order to mitigate the effects of 
fluctuations in the prices of fuels used as inputs; and, iv) reducing the discretion of the electric utilities to 
grant access to the power grid, in order to boost the participation of private users. A revision of the tariff 
policy, in order to adjust it to efficiency criteria, seems also to be needed.   57
infrastructure and, at the same time, to enhance competition in other sectors, such as in the 
case of telecommunications. For example, the communication infrastructure of CFE could 
be used to provide telecommunications services and enhance competition in the 
telecommunications market, eventually leading to improved access conditions to the 
broadband infrastructure, a larger penetration of services and lower prices to users. Some 
efforts in that direction have been done in the last years. In particular, in November 2006, 
CFE received the concession to provide telecommunication services as a way to exploit its 
fiber optic infrastructure, the second largest “backbone” telecommunication infrastructure 
in the country. In May 2009, the government announced its intention to auction part of its 
dark fiber network to third parties on those routes where CFE has spare capacity. This will 
allow the entrance of new competitors, beside CFE and the dominant company TELMEX, 
in the interstate telecommunication business.
88 It remains to bee seen if the amount of dark 
fiber auctioned is enough to develop a robust effective competition in the sector. Another 
similar example is PEMEX’s cogeneration capacity in its petrochemical and refining 
processes, which could be exploited to generate electricity at lower prices to customers, by 
allowing the most inefficient electric power capacity to be phased out.
89 At the same time, 




5   Current challenges  
The evidence described in this paper suggests that Mexico’s poor long-run growth 
performance is fundamentally linked with an institutional framework that induces 
unproductive rent-seeking behavior by different groups of economic agents, in a context of 
non-competitive and rigid market structures, instead of promoting investment, the use of 
                                                 
88 The CFE received the concession, for a period of 15 years, to provide telecommunications services through 
selling capacity (illuminated fiber). However, the benefits of leasing part of the CFE’s excess fiber optic cable 
space (dark fiber), in terms of enhancing competition in interurban communication (backbone network), 
would clearly be larger than those that could be reaped under the current conditions. The dark fiber leasing is 
a common practice in several countries. See for example the Edison Carrier Solutions in the U.S. 
(http://www.edisonconnect.com/wireline/darkfiber.asp) and the Toronto Hydro Telecom in Canada 
(http://www.hydroonetelecom.com/business_solutions/dark_fiber.html). 
89 Complementary actions, such as allowing PEMEX to sell its energy to CFE through market mechanisms 
and the application of efficient interconnection rules to access the power grid, need to be taken in order to 
reap out the largest benefits from cogeneration. 
90 In a context of budgetary constraints, PEMEX’s incentives have been to only exploit crude oil projects, 
which are currently more profitable than those of natural gas extraction.   58
modern technologies and an efficient allocation of resources. In this context, in order to 
boost economic growth, Mexico needs a deep change in the structure of incentives of its 
economy. This, in order to: i) induce increases in the accumulation of capital (both physical 
and human); ii) improve the efficiency in the allocation of resources; and, iii) enhance 
productivity. To attain these objectives, in turn, Mexico seems to require specific actions in 
two interrelated fronts: 
 
  Institutional change. Deep reforms to the institutional framework to encourage 
competition in both input and product markets and, in particular, to eliminate 
barriers of entry into economic activities and to empower consumers, are needed. 
Also, reforms that enhance flexibility in the allocation of resources, such as labor, 
seem to be especially relevant to boost competitiveness. The design of a regulatory 
framework that supports technology upgrading and discourages unproductive rent-
seeking behavior is also needed. Clearly, for all these policies to have the desired 
effect, we also need the agents that regulate economic activity to have the 
appropriate incentives too.  
  
  Public policies.  The role of the government to foster growth and development 
through the application of public policies in specific areas should also be enhanced. 
This is especially the case in activities where social returns may surpass private 
returns, such as the creation of basic infrastructure, the formation of human capital 
(schooling, health, social security and abatement of poverty) and R&D. Some of 
these activities may fundamentally require explicit promotion through public 
expenditure programs, while others, such as R&D and the adoption of the latest 
technologies, may also require the application of specific incentive mechanisms for 
their implementation on the part of the private sector.
91 It is clear that, in order to 
attain adequate results in this front, public resources should be allocated efficiently, 
                                                 
91 Concerning this last topic, we only need to take a look at countries where stronger links between the 
academic and industrial sectors have promoted a faster technological progress. In contrast, the lack of links 
between the productive sector and universities in Mexico seems to be limiting its growth potential (see 
Lederman, Maloney and Servén, 2005; Maloney and Perry, 2005). To boost technological progress, a 
reinforcement of the institutions that protect intellectual property rights may also be helpful (see World Bank, 
2006a).    59
which in some instances may require a re-design of the incentives faced by 




Note that, within these fronts, the recurring areas where actions appear to be 
required are the same as those mentioned from the start of this analysis: institutions that 
promote an efficient allocation of resources, market flexibility and competition. In this 
context, many challenges remain. Among others, the most relevant points that we should 
emphasize are the following: 
  
Institutions supporting transparency and efficiency in public spending. In terms of 
reforms directed towards improving transparency and access to information, the approval of 
the Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública (Federal Law of 
Public Information Access) in 2002 is intended to guarantee the access to government 
public information, the protection of personal information at the disposal of the federal 
government and the solution of any refusal to access information gathered by government 
entities. The enactment of this law is expected to induce more accountability of authorities 
and, thus, could lead to improvements in the efficiency of the allocation of public resources 
(see Islam, 2004; Angeletos and Pavan, 2004). It is relevant to emphasize that, in July 
2007, a constitutional reform that extends the transparency implications of the law 
approved in 2002 to state governments and municipalities was enacted. However, this does 
not necessarily guarantee that accountability related to government spending at local levels 
will be immediately achieved. Amongst others, a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
classification and accounting practices of local governments persists. Furthermore, a larger 
amount of resources than those currently being assigned to the hiring and training of 
personnel in charge of evaluation and control of local spending seems to be needed. Finally, 
                                                 
92 To give an example of the impact that the allocation of public resources may have on output, consider the 
case of public schooling. Manuelli and Seshadri (2007) show that, in a context characterized by ability 
heterogeneity and credit constraints, distortions in the allocation of the resources of the public education 
system across individuals and schooling levels (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary), seem to be partly 
responsible of Latin America’s poor economic performance in the last decades. In particular, their results 
suggest that the Latin American countries they study might have been overinvesting in higher education.   60
the local institutions in charge of enforcing transparency are not fully autonomous from 
local governments.  
The extension of transparency and accountability criteria to all government levels 
should also be complemented with deep changes in the incentives faced by policymakers in 
charge of the allocation of public spending. This, in order to guarantee that these 
expenditures are not assigned to unproductive uses and, instead, become more efficiently 
allocated towards public policies in concepts with high social returns that may have been 
unattended in the past. Among others, concepts that seem to be especially relevant are: i) 
improvements in the coverage and quality of the education system; and ii) increasing the 
availability of basic transportation, communications and energy infrastructure in some 
regions of the country that have been relatively isolated from trade and investment flows.
93  
In this context, the incentive system governing fiscal policy should not only focus 
on mechanisms to increase tax revenues so as to guarantee sufficient funding for public 
programs with stable sources, but should also give priority to the efficient allocation of 
resources on the spending side. In relation to this point, the fiscal reform approved by 
Congress in September 2007 was fundamentally directed to improve the revenue side of the 
public finances.
94 The reform also recognized the need to improve the allocation and 
efficiency of public spending and, in particular, the priority of enhancing the effectiveness 
of public policies related to education, health, poverty alleviation and the reduction of 
regional disparities in terms of basic infrastructure. Furthermore, the need to make the 
government accountable for the results of public spending programs was also recognized 
                                                 
93 According to the evidence, the southern states of the country, where there are relatively higher poverty 
levels, may have grown less than the northern region after Mexico opened up to trade, not only because their 
remoteness from the U.S. market, but also because of a lack of human capital and an appropriate 
communications and transportation infrastructure to take advantage of the new sources of growth derived 
from trade liberalization (see Chiquiar, 2005). In this context, according to Dávila, Kessel and Levy (2004), 
the construction of railroads and paved roads connecting the southern region to nearby ports and to the main 
transportation networks would seem to allow it to reap larger benefits from globalization. 
94 The reform eliminates some special regimes, targets fiscal evasion and widens the fiscal base onto sectors 
that were traditionally exempted. This relies on: i) the introduction of a new flat-rate tax on a measure of 
value added, that would be paid only when its burden is larger than the current corporate income tax to firms 
(thus acting in fact as a means of control to the latter tax); and, ii) a new tax of 2% on cash deposits in excess 
of 25 thousand pesos a month made in financial institutions (this tax may only be credited against other taxes 
if the taxpayer has an activity registered in the Federal Registry of Contributors, RFC). While the first of the 
abovementioned taxes is directed to prevent fiscal evasion and to de facto eliminate some special regimes that 
characterized the previous regime, the second is directed to increase the burden on entities that typically evade 
taxes by operating in the informal sector of the economy. The reform also included a new scheme to distribute 
federal resources to state and municipalities. Under this scheme, the formulas for the distribution of resources 
are oriented to reward economic growth and tax collection efforts of sub-national governments.   61
explicitly. In this sense, the approved reform suggests mechanisms for a results-oriented 
evaluation of public policies and to subject budgetary allocations to measurable results 
derived from these evaluations. Although the explicit recognition of these issues goes in the 
right direction, it remains to be seen if the mechanisms proposed are sufficient to guarantee 
that these reforms will achieve the intended improvements in the allocation and use of 
resources towards activities with higher social returns or not. For example, among other 
issues, a necessary condition for this scheme to work as intended is an appropriate system 
of incentives for the evaluators of public policies.
95 
A related point that could be emphasized here is that transparency and 
accountability criteria should be especially relevant in the operation of state-owned 
enterprises. In this context, the energy reform approved in November 2008 established 
mechanisms for a greater transparency and a better accountability of the state-owned oil 
company, PEMEX, through a new structure of corporate governance.
96 Although the main 
objective of the reform, which focuses only on the oil sector, is to increase the operational 
capacity of PEMEX to explore and exploit new fields, the creation of new surveillance 
bodies, inside and outside PEMEX, is expected to contribute to improve the allocations and 
use of resources in the sector.
97 The impact of the reform on transparency and 
accountability, as well as its success on providing a more flexible framework for the 
                                                 
95 A second fiscal reform is currently being discussed to further improve the revenue side of the public 
finances. The federal government has faced considerable difficulties to gather support for different versions of 
the reform precisely reflecting, to a large extent, public discomfort about the low efficiency and accountability 
on the allocation of public resources.  
96 Among the most significant modifications of the reform in this area are:  i) a new conformation of the 
executive board,  with four additional external members besides the eleven members who previously 
conformed it; ii) creation of a transparency and audit committee constituted by members of the executive 
board, in change of the evaluation of the financial and operative performance of the company; iii) designation 
of a Commissioner, who will report about the veracity, sufficiency and rationality of the information issued 
by the company; and iv) creation of  a Oil Committee, constituted by independent specialized technicians who 
will contribute to evaluate and plan PEMEX exploration and exploitation activities; see Congreso General de 
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (2008a y 2008b). 
97 An important aspect of the reform is that it sets the conditions under which PEMEX can contract services 
from private firms. Although it does not allow “risk contracts”, the reform gives legal certainty to contracts 
with the private sector. A change in the tax regime of the company is also included, according to the field’s 
performance. The goal is to provide greater financial and operational flexibility to PEMEX in order to 
overcome the accumulated lags in investment. The reform also gives new attributions to the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía –CRE) to regulate first-hand sales of gas, fuel oil 
and basic petrochemicals, as well as to regulate their transportation and distribution (see Congreso General de 
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2008c). This last measure was adopted as a way to diminish the risks of price 
distortions and distortions in transport and distribution.   62
company’s operations, will depend on the possibilities of the new legal framework and 
governance structure of the company to change the system of incentives in the sector. 
 
Competition. In relation to antitrust policy, the Federal Law on Economic 
Competition (Ley Federal de Competencia Económica) was reformed in 2006 so as to grant 
enhanced authority to the COFECO. In particular, the reform enhanced the definition of 
monopolistic practices that the antitrust agency may prosecute, it established the possibility 
of making immunity agreements with those who cooperate in the investigations of the 
commission and it improved the capabilities of the commission to gather information. 
Furthermore, as a result of this reform, the COFECO is now allowed to combat interstate 
barriers to trade, and the federal government is now forced to consider the opinions issued 
by this institution.
98 In this context, COFECO has been recently publishing a set of policy 
guidelines to promote competition in diverse sectors. Among others, recommendations to 
foster telecommunications convergence, to diminish entry barriers in liquefied petroleum 
(LP) gas distribution and, as already described before, to improve transparency in retail 
banking, have been published.  
In order to enact these recommendations, however, legal reforms or amendments to 
regulation, which are beyond COFECO’s powers, are needed (Perez Motta, 2007). In 
particular, key areas remain within the field of competition where additional progress needs 
to be made. Indeed, despite the abovementioned reform, according to the World Economic 
Forum the effectiveness of competition policy in Mexico continued decreasing significantly 
from 2006 to 2008 (Mia and Lozoya, 2008, see Figure 27). In this regard, it is essential to 
give COFECO more and better legal instruments to enable it to carry out its activities in a 
more autonomous, expeditious, and decisive way, and to make its assessments have a 
stronger effect on the markets. Among others, it is essential to take action in the following 
areas:  
 
                                                 
98 Before this reform, COFECO could not prosecute several anti-competitive practices, such as actions 
intended to raise competitor’s costs, systematic sales below average variable costs, the granting of discounts 
in return of exclusivity, the persistent use of profits in one market to finance losses in another, in order to 
displace competitors, and arbitrary price discrimination. Furthermore, the Commission lacked the ability to 
make its resolutions be enforced by the courts. Many of these omissions were corrected with the reform. For 
example, price depreciation, arbitrary price discrimination, cross subsidies, hindering productive processes 
and raising competitors’ costs, are now formally typified as monopolistic practices by the law.    63
Figure 27. Effectiveness of Anti-Monopoly Policy 
(Higher values mean more effective policies) 
 
The Anti-Monopoly Policy Effectiveness Index goes from 1 to 7 and measures the effectiveness of the Anti-Monopoly Policy of a 
country: 1= the anti-monopoly policy is relaxed and does not promote competitiveness effectively and 7= the anti-monopoly policy is 
effective and promotes competitiveness.
Red bars represent Mexico, green bars represent countries of the basket of competitors and blue bars represent other countries of 
reference.
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a)  Budgetary autonomy. While COFECO is an autonomous entity in terms of 
its operation, is still relies on the federal government for budgetary purposes. 
Countries with success stories in the implementation of competition laws 
have fully independent antitrust agencies that report directly to Congress.  
 
b)  Protection and Judicial System.  Amparos (legal stays of action) have 
hindered the implementation of antitrust procedures.
99 These have been used 
extensively by the companies sanctioned by COFECO as a tool for delaying 
penalties and, in most cases, to evade resolutions. In this context, the current 
judicial system is considered by several studies as an obstacle to the 
promotion of competition (Avalos, 2006; OECD, 2006; Elizondo, 2009). 
 
                                                 
99 The amparo is a mechanism through which private parties may defer the effects of an act of authority by a 
regulator until the merits of the case are thrashed out in the courts (Levy and Walton, 2009).    64
c)  Penalties. When compared with other countries, Mexico is still far behind in 
this vital area.
100 In this context, an increase in the fines applied by 
COFECO should be made, in order for them to have the sanctioning and 
dissuasive effect expected from an economic penalty. In particular, it is 
necessary to establish fines as a function of the firm’s assets and revenues, 
as opposed to fines based on a certain amount of minimum wages, which 
produce fines that are insignificant compared with the benefits agents derive 
from monopolistic practices. In this regard, COFECO has already proposed 
a set of more effective penalties.
101 Also, as in the case of some other 
countries, the imprisonment of firm executives found guilty of deliberately 
orchestrating anti-competitive practices should be considered as a feasible 
mechanism that could be used to deter these practices effectively.   
 
Flexibility of the labor market. Concerning actions directed to enhance flexibility in 
this market, the reform to the state employees’ social security system (ISSSTE) approved in 
March 2007 is a step in the right direction. By switching the pension system of these 
workers from a pay-as-you-go scheme with defined benefits, to a fully-funded system 
based on defined contributions, this reform tends to promote larger flexibility in the labor 
market: under the previous system, the state worker lost the contributions he or she made if 
he or she switched to a job under a different pension system. In contrast, the worker’s 
contributions are now deposited in an individual account and, therefore, are not lost if the 
worker moves to another sector.  
There are, however, many other issues that need to be tackled in order to enhance 
flexibility in this market further and, thus, to promote an efficient allocation of resources. In 
particular, apart from the aforementioned reform to the state employees’ social security 
system, no significant reforms to the labor market have been made. In this context, it is 
                                                 
100 For example, the maximum fine for absolute monopolistic practices in Mexico amounts to little more than 
75 million pesos, while in other countries fines for this kind of practices are imposed for up to nearly 7 billion 
pesos (91 times more than in Mexico). In the case of relative monopolistic practices, the maximum penalty 
possible in Mexico is about 46 million pesos, while other countries have come to punish such practices with 
fines up to the equivalent of nearly 6.7 billion pesos (an amount approximately 147 times greater).  
101 In particular, an amendment is proposed to Article 35 of the Federal Economic Competition Law as 
follows: i) absolute monopolistic practices should be fined for up to 15% of the value of assets or total annual 
income; ii) for relative monopolistic practices, or concentration practices, a 9% of assets or total annual 
income fine should be applied; and, iii) in cases of backsliding, 20% of assets or total annual revenues.   65
clear from the evidence presented in the previous sections that there is large room for 
improvement in terms of enhancing labor market flexibility by reforming the current 
regulations related to the creation and termination of contracts.
102 Limiting the bargaining 
power of unions, especially in non-tradable sectors where a lack of competition in the 
product markets interacts with the bargaining power of these to generate rent-sharing 
schemes at the expense of price, service quality, and sometimes, public finances, would 
also be fruitful. Related to this last point, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) developed a 
theoretical model of an economy with these features. They show that, while the size of 
rents is determined by the degree of competition in the product markets, their distribution 
depends on the bargaining strength of workers. In this context, they suggest that the 
appropriate sequencing of reform implies first reforming the goods markets. In particular, 
by enhancing competition in the product markets, the size of rents diminishes, thus 
reducing the incentives of workers to fight for a larger share of these rents. This, along with 
the fact that enhanced competition in the goods markets reduces goods’ prices and, thus, 
increases real wages, facilitates support for labor market reform.
103  
Furthermore, the current incentives that workers and firms face may not be the most 
appropriate ones to promote the allocation of workers towards their most productive uses. 
For example, as mentioned before, the regulations that limit flexibility in the formal sector 
of the economy (especially those related with the creation of alternative labor contracts and 
with dismissal costs) not only reduce flexibility and raise the relative cost of labor, as 
perceived by firms in the formal sector, but may also increase the bargaining power of 
“insiders” in this sector, leading to a non-competitive equilibrium in the labor market. Also, 
according to Levy (2007), the relatively recent introduction of social programs directed to 
                                                 
102 In particular, the feasibility of replacing current dismissal costs with a system of unemployment insurance 
or a separation fund should be assessed. This could increase market flexibility, by reducing the costs of labor 
mobility. In this context, using the existing infrastructure of the savings for retirement system could facilitate 
the implementation of an employment insurance system. A similar reform was implemented successfully in 
Chile in 2002. In this regard, Acevedo, Eskenazi and Pagés (2006) argue that the main advantages of the new 
Chilean system would be that: i) it reduces companies’ labor costs; and, ii) it reduces the problem of moral 
hazard induced by traditional unemployment insurance schemes. The authors also argue that this system could 
be implemented in other emerging countries that have a relatively developed financial sector, such as Mexico. 
103 In particular, product market deregulation leads to lower rents in general and, possibly, to lower rents 
going to workers. Furthermore, in the short run, workers’ wages may decrease from labor market 
deregulation. However, if labor market reform is preceded by goods market reform (in particular, by a 
reduction of entry costs), then workers will gain in the long run as consumers through an increase in their real 
wages.    66
use fiscal resources in order to provide social protection to informal workers could be 
having as side effects some undesirable consequences in the labor market. In particular, 
these policies could be increasing the relative benefits to the worker of becoming employed 
in the informal sector of the economy where, as discussed previously, labor productivity 
seems to be lower than in the formal sector.
104  
In this context, an assessment of whether all the benefits associated with mandatory 
social security are truly valued by employees in a manner consistent with the cost involved 
is needed. Additionally, it may be desirable to decouple public health services from the 
labor market. A gradual move from a public health system financed by contributions from 
wages to a funded system with stable sources of income (i.e., income or consumption taxes) 
could be implemented. This move would avoid conditioning access to public health to the 
status of the worker (i.e., formal or informal), could reduce incentives for informal 
employment, and would maintain a policy of universal health care without inducing 
additional distortions in the labor market. 
 
6   Final remarks 
In the last decade, Mexico made considerable progress in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilization. This, however, was not enough to reactivate growth during this period. The 
discussion in this paper highlights the need to move on to a second phase in the reform 
process, in which Mexico should focus on modifying the structure of its economy and, in 
particular, its system of incentives. Even when some achievements have recently been 
made in this front, the examples described in this paper suggest that there is a lot that still 
needs to be done. Furthermore, while we must acknowledge that the positive effects of 
some of the reforms that have been enacted are still to be seen, it is also important to 
recognize that, in many sectors, the reforms so far have not modified the current incentive 
structure, which still encourages unproductive rent-seeking behavior in a context of rigid, 
non competitive market structures. In this context, deep reforms are needed, so that the 
                                                 
104 The Seguro Popular, which was introduced in 2002 with a partial regional coverage and was extended to 
have nationwide coverage by 2005, is a new social security system aimed to entitle informal workers with the 
same kind of health and life insurance benefits that formal employees receive. One significant difference, 
however, is that contributions to the formal social security system (IMSS) are paid in parts by the employee, 
the employer and the government, while in the Seguro Popular scheme, a large part of the cost is borne by the 
government.    67
current incentive system gives way to a new structure of incentives that foster investment, 
productivity and an efficient allocation of resources. Given the lack of success in some past 
reforms, we should now start asking ourselves if the changes in the structure of incentives 
of the economy should go so deep as to modify those incentives currently faced by the 
persons and institutions that are supposed to carry on the reform process themselves.  
We must acknowledge that this is not an easy task. The atmosphere of “reform 
fatigue” in the population, the resistance of the groups that may be affected by reforms and, 
especially, the difficulty to carry out a comprehensive reform path in an environment of 
extremely unequal distribution of endowments and income, which may sustain a stable 
equilibrium of reform paralysis (see Rajan, 2009; Levy and Walton, 2009), are important 
challenges that need to be sorted out. The complexity of determining the proper sequence 
of reforms and the technical complications to implement them add further difficulties to the 
process. These challenges, however, are no excuse for inaction. Many countries have been 
able to go through the reform process successfully and, as a consequence, have boosted 
their growth rates in a sustained manner, at the same time that they have been able to 
improve the wellbeing of important segments of their populations. 
Given the current international environment, in which the possible long-lasting 
consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 on U.S. consumption patterns may lead to a 
reduction of the dynamism of the external demand that Mexico faces, the need of 
deepening the reform process in this country has become even more urgent. In this context, 
undertaking the needed reforms to boost its potential growth, reduce its unequal income 
distribution and, especially, lower its relatively high poverty rates, should be at the top of 
Mexico’s policy agenda.   
   68
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